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WHEN ANY SENTENCE IS A LIFE SENTENCE: 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST  
EX-OFFENDERS 
DALLAN F. FLAKE

 
ABSTRACT 
For the sixty-five million Americans with a criminal record, it is 
cruelly ironic that perhaps the most important resource for turning 
their lives around—employment—is also often the most elusive. Shut 
out from legitimate job opportunities, many ex-offenders resort to 
illegal means of survival that hasten their return to prison. 
Recidivism has devastating consequences not only for the individual 
offender, but also the family, the community, and society at large. 
This article proposes three amendments to Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 that seek to balance ex-offenders’ need for 
employment with employers’ safety concerns. First, employers 
should be prohibited from discriminating against an ex-offender 
whose criminal record is not directly related to the job in question 
or who does not pose an unreasonable threat to property or to the 
safety of others. Second, employer inquiries about an applicant’s 
criminal record should be delayed until after at least one job 
interview. Third, a negligent hiring provision should be added to 
Title VII that creates a rebuttable presumption against negligence 
and that caps damages in certain cases. These measures represent a 
sensible, middle-of-the-road approach that promotes the 
employment of ex-offenders in appropriate cases, while ensuring 
that neither employers nor the public are unduly burdened as a 
result.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“Been clean, can’t get a job, I guess because of my background. My 
past predicts my future.”
1
 After spending eleven years in prison for street 
crimes, Maurice Ruffin knows his employment prospects are bleak. This is 
especially true in a tight job market, where one nonprofit official who 
trains ex-convicts in job-hunting skills lamented, “They’re always at the 
back of the line, and the line just got a lot longer.”
2
 For Maurice and the 
 
 
 1. Kelly Avellino, Henrico Tattoo Removal Clinic Helps Offenders Job Hunt with ‘Fresh Face’, 
NBC12 (Apr. 25, 2014, 6:18 PM), http://www.nbc12.com/story/25256658/henrico-tattoo-removal-
clinic-helps-offenders-job-hunt-with-fresh-face.  
 2. Aaron Smith, Out of Prison, Out of a Job, Out of Luck, CNNMONEY (Nov. 11, 2009, 6:46 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/11/11/news/economy/convict_employment/; see also Kimani Paul-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/7
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sixty-five million other Americans with a criminal record,
3
 it is cruelly 
ironic that perhaps the most important resource for turning their lives 
around—employment—is also often the most elusive.
4
 Due to persistent 
stigmas and stereotypes about people with criminal records, ex-offenders 
know that so long as employers can deny them employment because of 
their criminal history, any sentence is effectively a life sentence they must 
continue serving long after their debt to society has been paid. 
Despite broad consensus that ex-offenders need to be working, there is 
considerable disagreement over how best to accomplish this feat.
5
 
Employers often resist efforts to limit their ability to consider an 
individual’s criminal history out of fear that such restrictions could 
jeopardize workplace safety and expose them to negligent hiring claims.
6
 
Lawmakers, too, are often reluctant to push for legislation facilitating the 
employment of ex-offenders because they do not want to appear soft on 
crime.
7
 In fact, the vast majority of laws and regulations concerning ex-
offender employment are exclusionary in nature, banning individuals with 
criminal records from entire industries, restricting licensing boards from 
granting occupational licenses to ex-offenders, and mandating that 
 
 
Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and Employment Discrimination in the 
Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 894 (2014) (noting it is “particularly difficult” for ex-offenders 
to find work in the wake of the 2008 recession).  
 3. See MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP’T LAW 
PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND 
CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 3 (2011), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/65_million_need_ 
not_apply.pdf?nocdn=1 [hereinafter 65 MILLION]. 
 4. See Jessica S. Henry & James B. Jacobs, Ban the Box to Promote Ex-Offender Employment, 
6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 755, 755 (2007) (“It is close to a criminological truism that the lack of 
a legitimate job fosters criminality and, conversely, that holding a legitimate job diminishes criminal 
conduct.”); Mark W. Lipsey, What Do We Learn from 400 Research Studies on the Effectiveness of 
Treatment with Juvenile Delinquents?, in WHAT WORKS: REDUCING REOFFENDING 63–78 (James 
McGuire ed., 1995) (meta-analysis of nearly 400 studies from 1950 to 1990 found employment to be 
the single most effective factor in reducing recidivism); see also infra Part I.D. 
 5. Sandra J. Mullings, Employment of Ex-Offenders: The Time Has Come for a True 
Antidiscrimination Statute, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 261, 261–62 (2014) (explaining that society feels 
ambivalence about ex-offenders, on the one hand wanting them to have rehabilitation opportunities, 
but also fearing such opportunities could endanger others).  
 6. See Joe LaRocca, Erase the Box, Endanger Customers, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N (July 27, 2011), 
https://nrf.com/news/loss-prevention/erase-the-box-endanger-customers; NFIB Helps Defeat ‘Ban-the-
Box’ Legislation in Louisiana, NAT’L FED’N OF INDEP. BUS. (May 13, 2014), http://www.nfib. 
com/article/nfib-helps-defeat-ban-the-box-legislation-in-louisiana-65622/; Rhonda Smith, Employer 
Concerns About Liability Loom as Push for Ban-the-Box Policies Spreads, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 
18, 2014), http://www.bna.com/employer-concerns-liability-n17179893943/.  
 7. See Marc Mauer, Thinking About Prison and Its Impact in the Twenty-First Century, 2 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 607, 607 (2005); Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the 
Tough on Crime Movement Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 
15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 23–32 (2013). 
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employers perform criminal background checks on applicants for certain 
types of jobs.
8
 In reality, just one federal law limits an employer’s ability 
to discriminate against ex-offenders. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, an employer can be held liable for treating people with 
similar criminal records differently, or for maintaining a policy that 
screens individuals based on criminal history—but only if such differential 
treatment is otherwise tied to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
9
  
Although negative stereotypes about ex-offenders abound, growing 
recognition that people with criminal records need to be working has 
generated a number of positive changes at the state and local levels. 
Fourteen states now limit discrimination against ex-offenders in public 
employment,
10
 and five of those states have extended such prohibitions to 
the private sector.
11
 Dozens of cities, including Boston
12
 and San 
Francisco,
13
 have enacted similar ordinances. Perhaps the most promising 
development is the growing “Ban the Box” movement, which seeks to 
remove criminal background questions from job applications and to delay 
background check inquiries until further in the hiring process to give ex-
offenders an opportunity to interview and explain why they are qualified 
for employment instead of being automatically disqualified because of 
 
 
 8. Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework 
for Evaluating Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 24 
(2005) (noting that in recent years “there has been a major expansion of state and federal laws denying 
employment in key entry-level jobs, with many of the new laws imposing lifetime felony 
disqualifications even for nonviolent offenses”); Elena Saxonhouse, Note, Unequal Protection: 
Comparing Former Felons’ Challenges to Disenfranchisement and Employment Discrimination, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1611–14 (2004) (surveying various laws restricting the employment of ex-
offenders in public and private employment). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2013); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN 
EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 §§ IV–V (2012), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf [hereinafter EEOC 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE] (disparate treatment and disparate impact claims relating to criminal 
history must be tied to a Title VII-protected trait). 
 10. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-904.E (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-5-101 (2014); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 46a-80 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 112.011 (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5 (2014); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 22-4710 (2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 335b.020 (West 2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 37:2950 (2014); MINN. STAT. § 364.03 (2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-2-3 to -6 (2015); N.Y. 
CORRECT. LAW §§ 750–753 (McKinney Supp. 2013); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.15 (McKinney Supp. 
2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9124–9125 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.96A.020, .030, 
.060 (2015); WIS. STAT. § 111.335 (2015). 
 11. HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4710; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.15; N.Y. 
CORRECT. LAW §§ 750–753; 18 PA. CONST. STAT. §§ 9124–9125; WIS. STAT. § 111.335. 
 12. BOS., MASS., MUN. CODE § 4-7 (2014). 
 13. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 49 (2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/7
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their criminal record.
14
 By 2015, eighteen states, Washington, D.C., and 
over one hundred cities and counties had passed laws banning the box.
15
 
New York City’s recently-enacted Fair Chance Act, for example, prohibits 
employers from inquiring about a person’s criminal background in most 
cases until after a conditional offer of employment is made.
16
 The EEOC 
has likewise endorsed removing criminal history questions from 
applications as a best practice.
17
 
In addition to legal changes, ex-offenders are benefitting from a variety 
of other measures designed to facilitate their employment. In 2011, US 
Attorney General Eric Holder established a cabinet-level federal 
interagency Reentry Council to “coordinat[e] re-entry efforts and 
advanc[e] effective re-entry policies.”
18
 The federal government has also 
launched several initiatives to encourage the employment of ex-offenders. 
For example, under the Work Opportunity Tax Credit program, employers 
claim approximately $1 billion in federal tax credits each year for hiring 
individuals from certain target groups, including ex-offenders.
19
 The 
Second Chance Act allows the federal government to provide substantial 
resources to state and local governments and community organizations to 
help ex-offender reintegration.
20
 And the Federal Bonding Program 
provides employers with free-of-charge bond insurance against theft, 
forgery, larceny, and embezzlement to further incentivize employers to 
hire ex-offenders.
21
  
 
 
 14. Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?: Disparate Impact and 
Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 211 
(2014). 
 15. MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & NAYANTARA MEHTA, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 
RESOURCE GUIDE, BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES ADOPT FAIR HIRING POLICIES 
TO REDUCE BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH CONVICTION RECORDS 1 (2015), available 
at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf [hereinafter 
BAN THE BOX]. 
 16. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN CODE § 8-107(10)(a) (2015); see also Mayor de Blasio Signs “Fair 
Chance Act,” NYC.GOV (June 29, 2015), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/456-
15/mayor-de-blasio-signs-fair-chance-act-#/0. 
 17. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § V.B.3.  
 18. Amy L. Solomon, In Search of a Job: Criminal Records as Barriers to Employment, NAT’L 
INST. JUST. J., June 2012, at 42, 46. 
 19. Work Opportunity Tax Credit, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.doleta.gov/business/ 
incentives/opptax/wotcEmployers.cfm (last updated Jan. 14, 2015). 
 20. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 21. NAT’L H.I.R.E. NETWORK, NATIONAL BLUEPRINT FOR REENTRY: MODEL POLICIES TO 
PROMOTE THE SUCCESSFUL REENTRY OF INDIVIDUALS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS THROUGH 
EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION 15–16 (2008), available at http://www.hirenetwork.org/sites/default/ 
files/National_Blueprint_For_Reentry_08.pdf. 
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Advocacy groups are also playing a greater role in assisting ex-
offenders in employment. Organizations like The National HIRE Network 
and The Next Step maintain successful networks of ex-offenders looking 
for employment, agencies and facilities that manage their post-release 
experience, and employers willing to hire ex-offenders.
22
 In Chicago, ex-
offenders can receive vocational training, employment placement 
assistance, life-skills training, and mentoring.
23
 
Lastly, a growing number of employers are voluntarily changing their 
hiring practices to facilitate the employment of ex-offenders. High-profile 
retailers Walmart and Target Corporation recently announced plans to 
remove the criminal history box from their applications nationwide.
24
 In 
Columbia, South Carolina, a furniture moving company appropriately 
named “Felons R Us” proudly hires employees with nonviolent felony 
records.
25
 Other businesses have created specialized training programs 
involving the recruitment of ex-offenders and team up with community-
based organizations to match ex-offenders with stable employment.
26
 
Although certainly steps in the right direction, these efforts are 
inadequate given the reality that each year approximately seven hundred 
thousand prisoners are released back into their communities,
27
 often 
without any prospects for employment.
28
 Within five years of release, 
 
 
 22. See, e.g., NAT’L H.I.R.E. NETWORK, http://www.hirenetwork.org/ (last visited July 5, 2015); 
NEXT STEP, https://www.thenextstep99.com/ (last visited July 5, 2015). 
 23. See Chicagoland Youth and Adult Training Center, CHICAGOJOBTALK.ORG, 
http://www.chicagojobs.org/node/1599 (last visited Jan. 29, 2015). 
 24. See, e.g., Companies Rethink Hiring Policies for Former Criminals, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J. 
(Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.ibj.com/articles/46052-companies-rethink-hiring-policies-for-former-
criminals; Janet Moore, No More Box for Crimes on Target Job Applications, STAR TRIBUNE 
(Minneapolis), Oct. 26, 2013, at 1D, available at http://www.startribune.com/business/ 
229310141.html; NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, COMMUNITY LEADERS SUPPORT FAIR CHANCE 
POLICIES 1, available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/0e4548d1901d375c45_2tm6b3qa4.pdf; Target Corp. 
Bans the Box on Employment Applications, JAILS TO JOBS (Nov. 1, 2013), http://jailstojobs.org/ 
wordpress/target-corp-bans-the-box-on-employment-applications/.  
 25.  Roddie Burris, SC Company Gives Convicted Felons a Second Chance, THE STATE 
(Columbia, S.C.) (May 25, 2013, 8:52 PM), http://www.thestate.com/2013/05/25/2785716/sc-
company-gives-convicted-felons.html. 
 26. See, e.g., Zoey Thill et al., Thinking Outside the Box: Hospitals Promoting Employment for 
Formerly Incarcerated Persons, 161 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 524, 524–25 (2014). 
 27. See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 239808, PRISONERS 
IN 2011 1 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf. 
 28. See Christy A. Visher & Jeremy Travis, Transitions from Prison to Community: 
Understanding Individual Pathways, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 89, 95 (2003) (citation omitted) (“Although 
slightly more than half of inmates report being employed full-time prior to incarceration, the poor 
employment histories and job skills of returning prisoners create diminished prospects for stable 
employment and decent wages upon release.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/7
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more than three fourths of ex-prisoners are rearrested,
29
 and between 40 
and 50% of ex-prisoners return to prison.
30
 Because employment is one of 
the strongest predictors of recidivism,
31
 any hope of lowering the United 
States’ recidivism rate will require major changes to federal employment 
discrimination laws to give ex-offenders greater employment 
opportunities. Although restrictions on ex-offender employment make 
sense in some settings,
32
 in many situations a person’s criminal record has 
little or no bearing on job performance. In those cases, legislative 
protections for ex-offenders are warranted. 
This article advocates for three amendments to Title VII that would 
facilitate the employment of ex-offenders without unduly burdening 
employers or the public. First, Title VII should be amended to prohibit 
employment discrimination if an ex-offender’s criminal record is not 
directly related to the job at issue or if the ex-offender does not pose an 
unreasonable threat of harm to property or to the safety of others. Second, 
Title VII should prohibit employers from inquiring about an applicant’s 
criminal history until after at least one interview. Third, a provision should 
be added to Title VII that creates a rebuttable presumption against 
admitting evidence of an offending employee’s criminal record in 
negligent hiring cases, if the employer made a good-faith, individualized 
determination that the employee would not pose an unreasonable risk. In 
such cases, damages should be limited to Title VII’s existing caps. These 
proposals represent a sensible, middle-of-the-road approach that would 
place more ex-offenders in the workplace instead of back in prison.  
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I examines the magnitude of 
the United States’ mass incarceration problem and the barriers ex-
offenders face in finding employment. It also reviews studies linking 
unemployment to recidivism and explains why recidivism has long-lasting 
 
 
 29. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 244205, RECIDIVISM OF 
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 1 (2014), available at 
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf. According to this study of 404,638 prisoners, 
approximately two thirds were rearrested within three years of release, and more than three fourths 
were rearrested within five years. Id. Of those prisoners who were rearrested, 56.7% were rearrested 
by the end of the first year. Id. Rearrest was most common among released property offenders 
(82.1%), compared with 76.9% of drug offenders, 73.6% of public order offenders, and 71.3% of 
violent offenders. Id. 
 30. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S 
PRISONS 2 (2011), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrusts 
org/reports/sentencing_and_corrections/StateRecidivismRevolvingDoorAmericaPrisons20pdf.pdf. 
 31. See infra Part I.D. 
 32. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.723, 28.733–.734 (West 2011) (prohibiting 
registered sex offenders from working within one thousand feet of a school). 
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and devastating consequences for individual offenders, their families and 
communities, and society at large. Part II examines employers’ legal 
duties toward ex-offenders under the Constitution, Title VII, and state 
negligent hiring laws, and discusses how the extant case law can help 
shape future legislative efforts to protect ex-offenders from employment 
discrimination. Finally, Part III proposes three amendments to Title VII 
that could increase ex-offender employment without exposing employers 
or the public to undue risk, and explores the potential impact of the 
proposed measures. 
I. AMERICA’S CRIMINAL PROBLEM 
A. Mass Incarceration in the United States 
The number of Americans with a criminal record is staggering. 
According to conservative estimates, sixty-five million Americans—over 
one in every four adults—have a criminal history.
33
 With twelve to 
fourteen million arrests annually, this population continues to grow 
rapidly.
34
 The United States’ crime problem is best illustrated by its 
incarceration rate. After five decades of relative stability, the rate of 
incarceration has more than quadrupled in the past forty years, from 161 
prisoners per 100,000 people in 1972 to a stunning 707 per 100,000 in 
2012.
35
 This rate is easily the highest in the world, far outpacing second-
place Rwanda (492) and third-place Russia (474).
36
 By comparison, 
Canada’s rate is just 118, and Mexico’s is 210.
37
 Although the United 
States is home to less than 5 percent of the world’s population, it locks up 
nearly one quarter of the world’s prisoners, with over 2.2 million offenders 
behind bars.
38
 The rates of alternative forms of correctional supervision, 
 
 
 33. 65 MILLION, supra note 3, at 3. 
 34. FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2009 1 (2009), available at 
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/arrests/index.html; see also Robert Brame et al., Cumulative 
Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25 (2012) (roughly 
one in every three Americans has been arrested by age twenty-three).  
 35. COMM. ON CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION, NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2014), available 
at johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/nrc/NAS_report_on_incarceration.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL]. 
 36. Id. at 36–37. 
 37. ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 3 
(10th ed. 2013), available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/ 
wppl_10.pdf. 
 38. CAROLYN W. DEADY, PELL CTR. FOR INT’L RELATIONS & PUB. POL’Y, INCARCERATION AND 
RECIDIVISM: LESSONS FROM ABROAD 1 (2014), available at http://www.salve.edu/sites/default/files/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/7
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including probation and parole, have experienced even sharper increases. 
In 2012, 3.94 million Americans were on probation, up from 923,000 in 
1976.
39
 An additional 851,000 Americans were on parole in 2012, 
compared to just 143,000 in 1975.
40
 At present, nearly seven million 
Americans—one in every thirty-five adults—are part of the overall 
correctional system population.
41
  
Rising incarceration rates have disproportionately impacted racial 
minorities, the poor, and the less educated—populations already at 
considerable disadvantages in employment.
42
 Racial minorities are far 
more likely to be arrested and convicted and face harsher sentences than 
whites.
43
 Nearly 60% of the United States’ prisoners are black or Latino, 
although these groups comprise less than 30% of the country’s overall 
population.
44
 If current trends continue, one out of every three black males 
born today will go to prison, as will one out of every six Latino males, 
compared to just one out of every seventeen white males.
45
 
Socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals are also far more likely to 
come into contact with the criminal justice system. A recent study of 
California arrest records concluded that “[f]or all races, every age group, 
 
 
filesfield/documents/Incarceration_and_Recidivism.pdf; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 
33. 
 39. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 40–41. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 42. 
 42. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, Racial Disparity in Unemployment, 93 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 30, 35–40 (2011) (finding blacks “experience substantially higher lifetime unemployment” than 
whites, even after controlling for premarket skills); Employment Projections: Earnings and 
Unemployment Rates by Educational Attainment, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_001.htm (last modified Apr. 2, 2015) (unemployment rate in 2014 
for a US adult age twenty-five or older with less than a high school diploma was 9.0%, compared to 
6.0% for adults with a high school diploma, 3.5% for adults with a bachelor’s degree, and 2.1% for 
adults with a doctoral degree); Gap in U.S. Unemployment Rates Between Rich and Poor Continues to 
Widen, NJ.COM (Sept. 16, 2013), www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2013/09/gaps_in_us_ unemployment_ 
rates.html (noting that in 2013, the unemployment rate for US families earning less than $20,000 was 
over 21%, whereas the unemployment rate for families with income of more than $150,000 was just 
3.2%).  
 43. SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS 
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_ICCPR% 
20Race%20and%20Justice%20Shadow%20Report.pdf. 
 44. Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration in the 2010 Census: State-by-State 
Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 28, 2014), http://www.prison 
policy.org/reports/rates.html. 
 45. Marc Mauer, Addressing Racial Disparities in Incarceration, 91 PRISON J. 87S, 88S (2011). 
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and age groups within races, arrest rates escalate as poverty levels rise.”
46
 
Additionally, educational inequalities in incarceration have skyrocketed 
over the past four decades, with nearly all of the growth in incarceration 
rates concentrated among those with no college education.
47
 The disparity 
is most pronounced among high school dropouts. On any given day, about 
one in every ten young male high school dropouts is in jail or juvenile 
detention, compared with just one in every thirty-five young male high 
school graduates.
48
 
The explosion in the United States’ correctional population is 
attributable to several factors. The rate of crime itself cannot fully explain 
this trend, given that incarceration rates have steadily risen over the past 
fifty years, even as the violent crime rate rose, then fell, rose again, then 
declined sharply.
49
 Instead, growth in the incarceration rate has stemmed 
primarily from lawmakers’ policy choice to increase the use and severity 
of prison sentences to control crime following the tumultuous social and 
political changes of the 1960s and 1970s.
50
 Consequently, incarceration 
for lesser offenses has become more prevalent, sentences for violent 
crimes and repeat offenders are now longer, and drug crimes are more 
harshly policed and punished.
51
 Incarceration is no longer reserved for the 
most severe crimes, but extends to a much broader range of offenses and a 
much larger segment of the population.
52
 This move toward greater 
incarceration reflects a widespread belief, particularly among law 
 
 
 46. Mike A. Males & Elizabeth A. Brown, Teenagers’ High Arrest Rates: Features of Young Age 
or Youth Poverty?, 29 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 3, 17 (2014). 
 47. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 66. 
 48. Andrew Sum et al., The Consequences of Dropping Out of High School: Joblessness and 
Jailing for High School Dropouts and the High Cost for Taxpayers (Oct. 2009) (unpublished working 
paper), available at http://www.northeastern.edu/clms/wp-content/uploads/The_Consequences_of_ 
Dropping_Out_of_High_School.pdf; see also PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: 
INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 31 (2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/ 
~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/CollateralCosts1pdf.pdf (noting that in 1980, 2.4% of 
white male dropouts were incarcerated, compared with 10.6% of black male dropouts and 3.2% of 
Hispanic male dropouts; by 2008, the percentages increased to 12% of white male dropouts, 37.1% of 
black male dropouts, and 7% of Hispanic male dropouts). 
 49. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 3. 
 50. Id. at 2–3, 70; Stephen J. Tripodi et al., Is Employment Associated with Reduced Recidivism? 
The Complex Relationship Between Employment and Crime, 54 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. 
CRIMINOLOGY 706, 707 (2010) (observing that growth in incarceration rates even as crime has 
decreased suggests “get tough on crime” policies are fueling the increase in prisoners). 
 51. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 3. 
 52. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 938 (2003) (stating that 
since the 1970s, “incarceration has changed from a punishment reserved primarily for the most 
heinous offenders to one extended to a much greater range of crimes and a much larger segment of the 
population”). 
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enforcement officials, that criminals must be dealt with harshly.
53
 This 
tough-on-crime mentality has ushered in an era of unprecedented legal 
changes, including “three strikes and you’re out” laws requiring minimum 
sentences of twenty-five years or longer for certain repeat offenders and 
“truth-in-sentencing” laws that mandate prisoners serve at least 85 percent 
of their sentences.
54
 
B. Barriers to Ex-Offender Employment 
A variety of barriers, both formal and informal, hinder many ex-
offenders’ ability to find steady employment. Some of these barriers, such 
as low education and deficient job skills, can perhaps best be overcome 
through nonlegal mechanisms, such as vocational training programs. Other 
barriers, including employer biases and overbroad exclusionary statutes 
and regulations, call for legal intervention. Because these barriers can 
drastically reduce an ex-offender’s odds of finding and maintaining 
employment, both legal and nonlegal responses are necessary. 
1. Individual Characteristics 
A major impediment to employment for many ex-offenders is their lack 
of much-needed work skills, educational qualifications, and a stable job 
history.
55
 For instance, one study found that just one third of males ages 
twenty-five to thirty-four in state prisons held a high school diploma, 
compared to 90% of males of the same age in the general population.
56
 
The study also found that nearly 80% of non-imprisoned males ages 
twenty-five to thirty-four were employed full time, compared to just 55% 
of inmates in the same demographic group.
57
 Another study found that 
approximately 40% of adult state prisoners are functionally illiterate, 
 
 
 53. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 35, at 70 (“[C]hanges in prevailing attitudes toward 
crime and criminals . . . led prosecutors, judges, and parole and other correctional officials to deal 
more harshly with individuals convicted of crimes.”). 
 54. Id. at 3. 
 55. Susan Lockwood et al., The Effect of Correctional Education on Postrelease Employment 
and Recidivism: A 5-Year Follow-Up Study in the State of Indiana, 58 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 380, 
382 (2012) (“The profile of the prison population has been consistently characterized as economically 
poor, educationally illiterate, and socially inadequate to societal norms.”); see also James S. Vacca, 
Educated Prisoners Are Less Likely to Return to Prison, 55 J. CORR. EDUC. 297, 297–304 (2004) 
(discussing how a disproportionate number of ex-offenders are unemployed because they are illiterate 
and lack vocational skills). 
 56. Christopher Uggen et al., Work and Family Perspectives on Reentry, in PRISONER REENTRY 
AND CRIME IN AMERICA 209, 211–12 (Jeremy Travis & Christy Visher eds., 2005).  
 57. Id. 
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compared to 21% of non-incarcerated adults.
58
 Moreover, some scholars 
have suggested “spending time in prison may further erode existing job 
skills and embed offenders into criminal networks.”
59
 Aside from 
possessing fewer skills and less education, ex-offenders may exhibit 
criminogenic attitudes and behaviors that further hinder their prospects for 
employment.
60
 For instance, those “who admit a willingness to continue 
criminal behavior or drug use . . . are unlikely to be committed to a 
conventional lifestyle” that includes “legitimate employment.”
61
 Likewise, 
ex-offenders who believe the legal system is unfair are more likely to 
resume criminal behavior after release and may be less likely to hold a 
steady job.
62
 Gottfredson and Hirschi argue that criminal history may also 
be an indicator of poor self-control and a tendency to reject the types of 
pro-social behaviors typically necessary to maintain a job.
63
  
2. Employer Biases 
The unlikelihood that ex-offenders will be hired because of their 
personal characteristics is compounded by employer biases toward people 
with criminal records.
64
 In Holzer and colleagues’ study of over 3,000 
employers in four metropolitan areas, nearly 20% of employers reported 
they would “definitely not” hire an applicant with a criminal record, and 
 
 
 58. JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 32 
(2003). 
 59. Mark T. Berg & Beth M. Huebner, Reentry and the Ties that Bind: An Examination of Social 
Ties, Employment, and Recidivism, 28 JUST. Q. 382, 388 (2011); see also Uggen et al., supra note 56, 
at 211–15 (citing various studies explaining how employment can increase an ex-offender’s social 
capital by replacing criminally involved friends with coworkers and other law-abiding peers). 
 60. Christy A. Visher et al., Employment After Prison: A Longitudinal Study of Former 
Prisoners, 28 JUST. Q. 698, 702 (2011) (“Former prisoners are likely to have other risk factors that 
may hinder their prospects for employment after release, including criminogenic attitudes and 
behaviors.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 85–120 
(1990). 
 64. Daniel S. Murphy et al., The Electronic “Scarlet Letter”: Criminal Backgrounding and a 
Perpetual Spoiled Identity, 50 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 101, 102 (2011) (“[A] criminal record is 
both a chronic and debilitating badge of shame that plagues exconvicts [sic] and exoffenders [sic] for 
the rest of their lives.”); Stuart J. Ishimaru, Comm’r, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 
Remarks on Employment Discrimination Faced by Individuals with Arrest and Conviction Records 
(Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/11-20-08/transcript.cfm (“Fears, 
myths and such stereotypes and biases against those with criminal records continue to be part of the 
. . . decision making for many employers.”). 
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42% indicated they would “probably not” do so.
65
 These percentages were 
significantly higher than the percentages of employers who would either 
definitely or probably not hire a welfare recipient (8%), a person with a 
GED (3%), a person with a spotty work history (41%), or a person 
unemployed for more than a year (16%).
66
 More recent data from over 600 
Los Angeles employers found that more than 40% of employers either 
definitely or probably would not hire an ex-offender, whereas only one 
fifth indicated they either definitely or probably would consider an 
applicant with a criminal history.
67
  
Employer biases against ex-offenders are further evident from audit 
studies conducted in Milwaukee and New York that determined an ex-
offender is about half as likely to receive a callback as a non-offender with 
comparable credentials.
68
 Significantly, both studies found that the 
negative effect of having a criminal history is stronger for black applicants 
than for white applicants. In the Milwaukee study, whites with a criminal 
background were half as likely as whites without a criminal background to 
receive a callback (17 to 34%), whereas blacks with a criminal background 
were about one third as likely as blacks without a criminal background to 
receive a callback (5 to 14%).
69
 Notably, whites with a criminal record 
were still more likely to receive a callback than blacks without a criminal 
record (17 to 14%).
70
 In the New York study, 22% of whites with a 
criminal record received callbacks, compared to 31% of white non-
offenders.
71
 By contrast, just 10% of black ex-offenders received 
callbacks, compared to 25% of black non-offenders.
72
 
 
 
 65. Harry J. Holzer et al., Will Employers Hire Ex-Offenders? Employer Preferences, 
Background Checks, and Their Determinants 8 (Inst. for Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper No. 
1243–02, 2002), available at http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/dps/pdfs/dp124302.pdf. 
 66. Id. at 9–10; see also Joseph Graffam et al., The Perceived Employability of Ex-Prisoners and 
Offenders, 52 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 673, 678–80 (2008) 
(demonstrating that individuals with a criminal background were rated as being less likely than other 
disadvantaged groups to obtain and maintain employment, rating only higher than those with 
intellectual or psychiatric disabilities). 
 67. Harry J. Holzer et al., The Effect of an Applicant’s Criminal History on Employer Hiring 
Decisions and Screening Practices: Evidence from Los Angeles 7 (Nat’l Poverty Ctr., Working Paper 
No. 04-15, 2004), available at http://www.npc.umich.edu/publications/workingpaper04/paper15/04-
15.pdf. 
 68. See Pager, supra note 52, at 955; Devah Pager et al., Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to 
Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with Criminal Records, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 195, 199 (2009). 
 69. See Pager, supra note 52, at 955–61. 
 70. Id. at 958. 
 71. Pager et al., supra note 68, at 200. 
 72. Id. 
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When asked about their reluctance or unwillingness to hire ex-
offenders, employers often express concern that ex-offenders will revert to 
criminal behaviors, thus opening the door to potential negligent hiring 
claims.
73
 Many employers also believe ex-offenders possess character 
flaws, such as unreliability and untrustworthiness, which prevent them 
from being productive employees.
74
 Some employers assume hiring ex-
offenders will create more work for their companies by having to complete 
work-release-related forms or deal with probation and parole officers.
75
 
Some employers continue to harbor strong negative impressions about ex-
offenders even though they report positive experiences with employing ex-
offenders in the past.
76
 Given the stigmas that persist about individuals 
with criminal records, it is hardly surprising that the National Employment 
Law Project’s analysis of Craigslist job postings found blanket no-hire 
policies for ex-offenders to be commonplace, even among major 
corporations and employment staffing firms.
77
  
3. Statutory and Regulatory Limitations 
A third barrier to the employment of ex-offenders is the vast network 
of federal, state, and local laws and regulations, estimated to be in the tens 
of thousands, that disqualify or substantially impede ex-offenders from 
various jobs and occupational licenses.
78
 In Florida alone, there are over 
seventy occupations affected by criminal history, ranging from speech 
pathologist to pest-control technician.
79
 Pennsylvania recently enacted 
legislation that not only expands the list of crimes that disqualify a person 
from working for a school, but also lengthens the ban from five years to 
 
 
 73. Devah Pager & Bruce Western, Investigating Prisoner Reentry: The Impact of Conviction 
Status on the Employment Prospects of Young Men 20–29 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Document No. 
228584, 2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228584.pdf. 
 74. Id. at 23–26. 
 75. Id. at 24–25. 
 76. Id. at 31–35. 
 77. 65 MILLION, supra note 3, at 13–18.  
 78. Mullings, supra note 5, at 263 (stating that “tens of thousands of statutes nationwide” have 
created a “complex set of barriers that will make reentry into the community and becoming a 
productive citizen difficult, if not impossible”); Lorelei Laird, Ex-Offenders Face Tens of Thousands 
of Legal Restrictions, Bias and Limits on Their Rights, ABA J. (June 1, 2013, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/ex-offenders_face_tens_of_thousands_of_legal_ restrictions. 
 79. Darren Wheelock et al., Employment Restrictions for Individuals with Felon Status and 
Racial Inequality in the Labor Market, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON RE-ENTRY 278, 284 (Ikponwosa 
O. Ekunwe & Richard S. Jones eds., 2011) (listing Florida statutes that limit the employment of ex-
offenders). 
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life for most of those crimes.
80
 Even statutes that do not specifically 
disqualify ex-offenders from employment can still impose significant 
limitations. For instance, a federal statute requires states to suspend the 
driver’s license of any ex-offender convicted of a drug offense for at least 
six months (or risk losing transportation funds), thus foreclosing a number 
of jobs that either require a person to drive or that cannot be reached via 
public transportation.
81
 Some of these laws, such as banning a person 
convicted of money laundering from working in a bank,
82
 are entirely 
reasonable. However, many statutory and licensing bars tend to be highly 
overinclusive,
83
 often disqualifying ex-offenders from jobs and 
occupational licenses unrelated to their convictions.
84
 
C. Ex-Offender Employment 
The foregoing barriers significantly impede ex-offenders’ ability to 
find and maintain employment. Longitudinal studies have consistently 
found that incarceration reduces how much ex-offenders work by 
anywhere from five to eight weeks per year.
85
 A study of recently-released 
ex-prisoners found that approximately three fourths had spent time 
searching for a job in the eight months following their release.
86
 Two 
months after release, 43% had been employed at some point since leaving 
prison, but only 31% were currently employed.
87
 Eight months after 
release, 65% had found work since their release, but only 45% were 
employed at the time of the interview.
88
 In addition to reducing weeks 
worked, incarceration generally decreases hourly wages by 15%.
89
 The 
negative effects of incarceration on employment and hourly wages 
 
 
 80. See Act 24 of 2011, 24 PS § 1-111. 
 81. 23 U.S.C. § 159 (2013). 
 82. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (2013). 
 83. Saxonhouse, supra note 8, at 1612 (noting that statutory and licensing bars often do not allow 
for “individualized consideration” and tend to be “highly overinclusive”). 
 84. Wheelock et al., supra note 79, at 285 (“Many states and municipalities disqualify ex-felons 
from professional licenses that are unrelated to the offense for which an ex-felon was originally 
convicted.”). 
 85. See, e.g., BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 119 (2006) 
(incarceration cuts employment by about five weeks per year for white men, and by nearly eight weeks 
per year for black and Latino men); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 48, at 11 (showing that 
incarceration reduces the average number of weeks worked by a forty-five-year-old male by nine 
weeks). 
 86. Visher et al., supra note 60, at 708. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 709. 
 89. See WESTERN, supra note 85, at 119. 
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combine to substantially reduce annual earnings, as men with prison 
records are estimated to earn between 30 and 40% less each year than non-
offenders.
90
 A Pew study calculated that incarceration results in an 
expected earnings loss of almost $179,000 through age forty-eight for ex-
offenders.
91
  
Ex-offenders’ struggle to secure jobs has been made worse in recent 
years by the growing prominence of criminal background checks. Since 
the September 11th terrorist attacks, “the criminal background check 
industry has grown exponentially.”
92
 This growth is due, in part, to greater 
concern among employers about negligent hiring claims, as well as 
technological advances that have made criminal background searches 
easier, faster, and less expensive than ever before.
93
 A Society for Human 
Resource Management (“SHRM”) survey found that 92% of employers 
perform criminal background checks on job applicants.
94
 By contrast, a 
study of data gathered in the 1990s found that just one third of employers 
always checked criminal records, and about half reported they sometimes 
ran background checks.
95
 When the SHRM study asked about what 
motivated employers to conduct criminal background checks, the three 
most popular answers were “[t]o ensure a safe work environment for 
employees,” “[t]o reduce legal liability for negligent hiring,” and “[t]o 
reduce/prevent theft and embezzlement, [and] other criminal activity.”
96
  
To what extent are policies, laws, and licensing regulations justified in 
excluding ex-offenders from employment? Do employees with a criminal 
record actually pose more of a threat to the workplace than non-offenders? 
While it is true that “one of the most robust findings in criminology is the 
strong positive relationship between past and future criminal offending,” 
an “equally robust finding” is that recidivism generally occurs quickly, 
 
 
 90. Id. at 120. 
 91. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 48, at 11–12. 
 92. 65 MILLION, supra note 3, at 1; see also Stacy A. Hickox & Mark V. Roehling, Negative 
Credentials: Fair and Effective Consideration of Criminal Records, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 201 (2013) 
(“Employers are relying on criminal record information to screen job applicants at increasing rates.”). 
 93. Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread 
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 328–29 (2009); Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 
902. 
 94. SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING: CONDUCTING CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND CHECKS 3 (2010), available at http://www.shrm.org/research/surveyfindings/articles/ 
pages/backgroundcheckcriminalchecks.aspx.  
 95. Harry J. Holzer et al., Can Employers Play a More Positive Role in Prisoner Reentry? 4 
(Mar. 20, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/410803_ 
PositiveRole.pdf. 
 96. SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., supra note 94, at 7. 
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and that the risk of recidivism declines the longer an ex-offender remains 
free from further contact with the criminal justice system.
97
 In fact, several 
studies have found there to be a “redemption point” for ex-offenders, 
meaning there comes a point in time when the recidivism risk converges to 
the risk of non-offenders, such that the ex-offender is about as unlikely as 
a non-offender to commit a crime.
98
 For example, Blumstein and 
Nakamura found in their study of 80,000 rap sheets that the redemption 
point varied by offense type and age at first arrest.
99
 For robbery, 
redemption took about nine years for a sixteen-year-old, eight years for an 
eighteen-year-old, and four years for a twenty-year-old, whereas for 
burglary, redemption took approximately five years, four years, and three 
years, respectively.
100
 Redemption studies provide evidence that “the 
value of criminal records in predicting future crime diminishes over 
time,”
101
 such that blanket proscriptions on the employment of ex-
offenders, at least in most occupations, are empirically unjustified. 
Employer concerns about ex-offenders are not always limited to the 
possibility they will commit additional crimes in the workplace, but may 
also extend to the ex-offenders’ job performance. Surprisingly, the link 
between criminal history and employee performance has received almost 
no research attention.
102
 The most promising research on this front is a 
twenty-three-year longitudinal study testing the relationship between 
criminal convictions and counterproductive employment behavior in 
 
 
 97. Kiminori Nakamura & Kristofer Bret Bucklen, Recidivism, Redemption, and Desistance: 
Understanding Continuity and Change in Criminal Offending and Implications for Interventions, 8 
SOC. COMPASS 384, 386 (2014). 
 98. See, e.g., Shawn D. Bushway et al., The Predictive Value of Criminal Background Checks: 
Do Age and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 41–52 (2011) 
(finding that the redemption point for novice offenders is ten years, whereas for older offenders it is 
considerably shorter); Megan C. Kurlychek et al., Enduring Risk? Old Criminal Records and 
Predictions of Future Criminal Involvement, 53 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 64, 72–78 (2007) (finding a 
redemption period of approximately seven years across all age groups); Megan C. Kurlychek et al., 
Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 483, 493–98 (2006) (finding that after six or seven years of remaining 
crime free, the risk of recidivism begins to approximate, but not match, the risk of new offenses among 
non-offenders); Keith Soothill & Brian Francis, When Do Ex-Offenders Become Like Non-Offenders?, 
48 HOW. J. CRIM. JUST. 373, 380–83 (2009) (finding that individuals who are convicted between age 
seventeen and twenty generally reach redemption around age thirty). 
 99. Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 93, at 338–39. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Nakamura & Bucklen, supra note 97, at 387. 
 102. Roberto Concepción, Jr., Need Not Apply: The Racial Disparate Impact of Pre-Employment 
Criminal Background Checks, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 231, 245 (2012). 
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young adults.
103
 The study not only found that adolescent criminal 
convictions did not predict counterproductive work behaviors, but in fact, 
“criminal conviction actually had small negative relationships with 
fighting or stealing at work.”
104
 The researchers suggested this could be 
due to a number of reasons, including that a past conviction could serve as 
a “preventative buffer” against misconduct at work because the ex-
offender learned her lesson, an ex-offender may be more careful at work 
because the fear of getting fired is greater among people with criminal 
records, or perhaps individuals with lengthy criminal records simply spend 
less time employed and therefore have fewer opportunities to engage in 
inappropriate work behaviors.
105
 Thus, as with redemption studies, 
preliminary research indicates employers may not be eliminating potential 
problem-employees by screening them for past criminal behavior.  
D. Unemployment and Recidivism 
Scholars have long contended that employment serves as an important 
mechanism to prevent ex-offenders from reverting to criminal activity.
106
 
President George W. Bush called attention to this relationship in his 2004 
State of the Union Address by declaring: “We know from long experience 
that if [released inmates] can’t find work or a home or help, they are much 
more likely to commit crime and return to prison.”
107
 Theoretical 
assumptions about the causal relationship between work and recidivism 
tend to emphasize the financial benefits of employment. Having a job 
enables ex-offenders to pay their bills and secure housing, thereby 
 
 
 103. Brent W. Roberts et al., Predicting the Counterproductive Employee in a Child-to-Adult 
Prospective Study, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1427 (2007). 
 104. Id. at 1434 (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Peter Finn, Job Placement for Offenders in Relation to Recidivism, 28 J. OFFENDER 
REHABILITATION 89, 89–90 (1998) (citing studies in support of assertion that “unemployment and 
low-paid and temporary jobs among ex-offenders may be associated with recidivism”); Byron 
Harrison & Robert Carl Schehr, Offenders and Post-Release Jobs: Variables Influencing Success and 
Failure, 39 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 35, 40–41 (2004) (analyzing studies showing how 
employment contributes to a stable prison rate); Henry & Jacobs, supra note 4, at 755 (“[M]any 
criminologists and social reformers have long advocated programs to expand employment 
opportunities for ex-offenders. . . .”); Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 899 (citing studies in support of 
argument that “stable work is among the most effective ways to protect against a return to criminal 
activity”); Tim Wadsworth, The Meaning of Work: Conceptualizing the Deterrent Effect of 
Employment on Crime Among Young Adults, 49 SOC. PERSP. 343, 346 (2006) (noting that studies 
consistently support a “deterrent influence of wages” on crime and recidivism). 
 107. George W. Bush, U.S. President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] WHEN ANY SENTENCE IS A LIFE SENTENCE 63 
 
 
 
 
“reduc[ing] the economic incentive to engage in income-generating 
crimes.”
108
 Theories also stress how work can generate greater personal 
support, stronger positive relationships, enhanced self-esteem, better 
mental health, and the ability to refocus one’s time and efforts on pro-
social activities, all of which reduce the likelihood of engaging in risky 
behaviors or associating with people who do so.
109
  
Although the relationship between employment and recidivism is 
complex, studies have consistently found that ex-offenders are less likely 
to recidivate if they are employed. Nally and colleagues’ study of over 
6,500 ex-prisoners five years after release found education and 
employment status to be the strongest predictors of recidivism, with 
employment lowering the odds of recidivism by 37.4%.
110
 Similarly, Berg 
and Huebner’s study of 401 parolees over forty-six months found 
employment to have a “significant, negative influence on recidivism.”
111
 
Six hundred days after release, 42% of employed parolees had survived 
without an arrest, compared to just 24% of unemployed parolees.
112
 
Sampson and Laub’s longitudinal analysis of juvenile delinquents likewise 
found job stability to be a significant deterrent to adult crime and 
deviance.
113
 Subjects with low job stability during young adulthood were 
at least five times more likely to engage in deviant behavior than those 
with high job stability.
114
 By contrast, Uggen found that employment did 
not affect the likelihood of recidivism in ex-offenders under age twenty-
seven; however, for ex-offenders age twenty-seven or older, employment 
 
 
 108. Berg & Huebner, supra note 59, at 387. 
 109. LE’ANN DURAN ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., INTEGRATED REENTRY 
AND EMPLOYMENT STRATEGIES: REDUCING RECIDIVISM AND PROMOTING JOB READINESS 2 (2013), 
available at https://www.bja.gov/Publications/CSG-Reentry-and-Employment.pdf; Robert J. Sampson 
& John H. Laub, Crime and Deviance Over the Life Course: The Salience of Adult Social Bonds, 55 
AM. SOC. REV. 609, 611 (1990) (arguing that employment by itself does not reduce crime, but the 
stability and commitment associated with work do); see also NANCY LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., 
RELEASE PLANNING FOR SUCCESSFUL REENTRY: A GUIDE FOR CORRECTIONS, SERVICE PROVIDERS, 
AND COMMUNITY GROUPS 15–16 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411767_ 
successful_reentry.pdf (noting that ex-offender employment promotes “self-efficacy and self-
sufficiency, building confidence in released prisoners that they can support themselves without 
needing to resort to criminal activities or reliance on family members or ‘hand outs,’ and providing a 
new social network that supports positive behaviors and serves as a protective factor against future 
criminal activity”). 
 110. John M. Nally et al., Post-Release Recidivism and Employment Among Different Types of 
Released Offenders: A 5-Year Follow-Up Study in the United States, 9 INT’L J. CRIM. JUST. SCI. 16, 
26–27 (2014). 
 111. Berg & Huebner, supra note 59, at 397. 
 112. Id. at 397–98. 
 113. Sampson & Laub, supra note 109, at 617. 
 114. Id. 
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reduced the likelihood of recidivism by 24%.
115
 Tripodi and colleagues 
found that employment did not reduce the likelihood of recidivism, but did 
prolong the length of time until reincarceration.
116
 Ex-offenders who 
obtained employment upon release from prison averaged 31.4 months 
before being reincarcerated, compared to 17.3 months for ex-offenders 
who did not obtain employment.
117
 
E. Consequences of Recidivism 
In the United States, approximately 45% of ex-prisoners are 
reincarcerated within three years.
118
 The consequences of recidivism are 
devastating not only to individual offenders, but also to their families, 
communities, and society at large. At the individual level, a prison 
sentence inflicts pain and suffering on the offender while behind bars, as 
he is “denied liberty, deprived of the company of loved ones, and exposed 
to the dangers and degradations of prison life.”
119
 But as unpleasant as 
prison can be, life after release can be just as difficult, if not more so. 
Studies have found that ex-offenders suffer long-term negative mental and 
physical health consequences as a result of incarceration,
120
 and that their 
life expectancy is diminished by two years for each year spent behind 
bars.
121
 Ex-offenders may also be especially prone to substance abuse.
122
 
As previously discussed, they also have substantial difficulty finding and 
 
 
 115. Christopher Uggen, Work as a Turning Point in the Life Course of Criminals: A Duration 
Model of Age, Employment, and Recidivism, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 529, 535–37 (2000). 
 116. Tripodi et al., supra note 50, at 713–14. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 30, at 2. 
 119. Michael Tonry, Crime, in CONTEMPORARY READINGS IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS 244, 252 (Anna 
Leon-Guerrero & Kristine Zentgraf eds., 2009). 
 120. See, e.g., Michael Massoglia, Incarceration as Exposure: The Prison, Infectious Disease, and 
Other Stress-Related Illnesses, 49 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 56, 64–65 (2008) (finding that 
individuals with a history of incarceration are consistently more likely to be afflicted with infectious 
diseases and other stress-related illnesses); Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The 
Long-Term Effects of Incarceration on Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115, 121–24 (2007) 
(finding that a history of incarceration strongly increases the likelihood of severe health limitations 
following release from prison). 
 121. Evelyn J. Patterson, The Dose-Response of Time Served in Prison on Mortality: New York 
State, 1989–2003, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 523, 525–26 (2013). 
 122. Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Postprison 
Adjustment, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON 
CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 33, 49–50 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003) 
(“The strains of postprison adjustment and the lack of available community-based treatment programs 
and social services . . . increase the likelihood that recently released prisoners will turn to drugs or 
alcohol as a form of self-medication and, as a result, severely compromise their successful 
reintegration into society.”). 
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maintaining steady employment,
123
 and their lifetime earnings are often 
significantly diminished.
124
  
The families of incarcerated individuals likewise experience reduced 
standards of living and lesser life chances both during the period of 
incarceration and following release.
125
 When a parent goes to prison, the 
family he supported often must apply for food stamps and other financial 
assistance.
126
 Incarceration increases the likelihood of household food 
insecurity by 4 to 15%.
127
 For married men, incarceration during marriage 
significantly increases the risk of divorce or separation.
128
 Imprisonment 
likewise impedes family formation, thus increasing the number of children 
raised in single-parent families.
129
 Children are particularly vulnerable to 
parental imprisonment. About half of US prisoners are parents of children 
under age eighteen, and the number of children with a parent in prison has 
nearly doubled, from roughly 950,000 children in 1991 to 1.7 million in 
2007, which represents 2.3% of the country’s children.
130
 Researchers and 
practitioners have identified a variety of negative long-term effects on 
children stemming from parental incarceration. For instance, a meta-
analysis of forty studies found that parental incarceration is associated 
with a higher risk of antisocial behavior in children.
131
 It may also disrupt 
the attachment bond between parents and children, which “will likely 
 
 
 123. See supra Part I.C. 
 124. Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. 
REV. 526, 541 (2002) (concluding “[t]here is strong evidence that incarceration reduces the wages of 
ex-inmates by 10 to 20 percent”). 
 125. Tonry, supra note 119, at 252 (“Insofar as ex-prisoners support partners and children, they 
too experience reduced standards of living and often lesser life chances than they would otherwise 
have had.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Sally Wallace & Robynn Cox, The Impact of Incarceration on Food Insecurity Among 
Households with Children 29 (Univ. of Ky. Ctr. for Poverty Research, Discussion Paper No. 2012-14, 
2012), available at http://uknowledge.uky.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=ukcpr_papers. 
 128. Leonard M. Lopoo & Bruce Western, Incarceration and the Formation and Stability of 
Marital Unions, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 721, 731 (2005) (finding that men in prison are 3.6 times 
more likely to divorce or separate). 
 129. Melinda Tasca et al., Family and Residential Instability in the Context of Paternal and 
Maternal Incarceration, 38 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 231, 244 (2011) (finding that “fathers with a 
history of incarceration [are] rarely involved in their children’s lives and that . . . in the majority of 
cases the mother [has] custody of the child and [is] raising the youth as a single parent”). 
 130. LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 222984, 
PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 1–2 (2008), available at http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf. 
 131. Joseph Murray et al., Children’s Antisocial Behavior, Mental Health, Drug Use, and 
Educational Performance After Parental Incarceration: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 138 
PSYCH. BULL. 175, 189–91 (2012). 
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adversely affect the quality of the child’s attachment to the parent,” and 
can also result in “poorer peer relationships and diminished cognitive 
abilities.”
132
 School-age children of incarcerated parents are at increased 
risk of poor academic performance, classroom behavior problems, 
transient school phobias, teasing, and ostracization.
133
 Children who 
witness a parent’s arrest also are more prone to suffer nightmares and 
flashbacks to the arrest incident.
134
 
Because most prisoners come from and return to a small set of inner-
city neighborhoods, incarceration and reentry affect entire communities in 
terms of health, housing, employment, and social networks.
135
 
Incarceration shapes the quality of life in such communities, as each 
resident experiences certain unintended consequences of incarceration, 
such as “elevated stigma, financial stress, fractured identities, and low 
self-esteem.”
136
 This can cause residents to withdraw from community 
life, which can ultimately diminish the well-being of local businesses, 
churches, and other elements of the community.
137
 Incarceration can also 
disrupt community networks that are essential for building and 
maintaining social capital, thus compromising the community’s ability to 
secure goods and services for its residents.
138
 This can be particularly 
devastating for children, whose chances in life are often tied to their level 
of social capital.
139
 Moreover, incarceration may also increase crime rates 
in some neighborhoods by fundamentally undermining community 
cohesion. Clear and colleagues found that above some critical number, 
men with criminal records become role models for youth, such that prison 
is no longer stigmatizing and stops serving as a deterrent to crime.
140
 
 
 
 132. Ross D. Parke & K. Alison Clarke-Stewart, The Effects of Parental Incarceration on 
Children: Perspectives, Promises, and Policies, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED, supra note 122, at 
189, 202–03. 
 133. Id. at 189, 203–04. 
 134. See Christina Jose Kampfner, Post-Traumatic Stress Reactions in Children of Imprisoned 
Mothers, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 89, 94–97 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston 
eds., 1995). 
 135. Eric Cadora et al., Criminal Justice and Health and Human Services: An Exploration of 
Overlapping Needs, Resources, and Interests in Brooklyn Neighborhoods, in PRISONERS ONCE 
REMOVED, supra note 122, at 285. 
 136. Dina R. Rose & Todd R. Clear, Incarceration, Reentry, and Social Capital: Social Networks 
in the Balance, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED, supra note 122, at 313, 314. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 313, 319. 
 139. Id. at 313, 321. 
 140. See Todd R. Clear et al., Coercive Mobility and Crime: A Preliminary Examination of 
Concentrated Incarceration and Social Disorganization, 20 JUST. Q. 33, 57–58 (2003); see also 
Tonry, supra note 119, at 252–53. 
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Furthermore, cycles of incarceration can also promote pervasive cynicism 
about the law and law enforcement, particularly among disproportionately 
impacted racial groups.
141
 
Incarceration and reincarceration also impact society at large. The cost 
of imprisonment itself is immense. In the past three decades, state 
corrections expenditures have more than tripled, from $15 billion in 1982 
to $48.5 billion in 2010.
142
 A substantial portion of these expenses is tied 
to repeat offenders. Indeed, Pew’s study of recidivism in forty-one states 
found that just a 10% decrease in recidivism could save more than $635 
million annually.
143
 Incarceration not only burdens the taxpayer, it strains 
the economy as a whole. Schmitt and Warner estimate that ex-offenders 
decrease overall employment rates by as much as 0.8 to 0.9%, resulting in 
a loss to the economy of between $57 and $65 billion per year.
144
  
II. LEGAL LIMITS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF EX-OFFENDERS 
Although no federal law prohibits employment discrimination against 
ex-offenders, courts have long recognized the injustices of overbroad 
exclusions of ex-offenders in employment.
145
 Courts utilize both the US 
Constitution and Title VII to occasionally strike down overbroad or unfair 
treatment of ex-offenders in employment. At the same time, courts have 
little sympathy for employers that employ ex-offenders who pose an 
unreasonable risk to others.
146
 In such cases, courts have not hesitated to 
hold employers liable under state negligent hiring, retention, and 
supervision laws. Although the Constitution, Title VII, and state tort laws 
differ in terms of their legal standards, each requires a certain measure of 
 
 
 141. See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the 
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 262–63 (2008). 
 142. TRACY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 239672, STATE CORRECTIONS 
EXPENDITURES, FY 1982–2010 1 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/scefy8210. 
pdf. 
 143. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 30, at 26. 
 144. JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POL’Y RESEARCH, EX-OFFENDERS 
AND THE LABOR MARKET 14 (2010), available at www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ex-offenders-
2010-11.pdf. 
 145. See, e.g., Soto-Lopez v. N.Y.C. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 713 F. Supp. 677, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(finding that there is a public policy in favor of hiring ex-offenders); Haddock v. City of New York, 
553 N.E.2d 987, 992 (N.Y. 1990) (“[T]he opportunity for gainful employment may spell the difference 
between recidivism and rehabilitation.”).  
 146. See, e.g., Blair v. Defender Servs., Inc., 386 F.3d 623, 628–30 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
employer’s failure to run a background check on a janitorial employee who assaulted a student 
precluded the employer from summary judgment on a negligent hiring claim). 
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reasonableness that can inform future legislative efforts to balance ex-
offenders’ need for employment with employers’ safety concerns. 
A. Constitutional Cases 
Despite occupying one of the most marginalized positions in American 
society, ex-offenders are not considered a suspect class for equal 
protection purposes and therefore do not receive heightened scrutiny when 
subject to state-sanctioned discrimination.
147
 Consequently, state action 
barring ex-offenders from employment only needs to rationally relate to a 
legitimate government purpose to survive an equal protection attack.
148
 
Despite this low bar, courts do occasionally strike down as irrational laws 
that exclude ex-offenders from employment, if such laws are not 
sufficiently tailored to reflect the “probable and realistic circumstances in 
a felon’s life.”
149
  
The Supreme Court first considered this issue in Hawker v. New York, 
which involved a challenge to a New York law that criminalized the 
practice of medicine after a felony conviction.
150
 In upholding the law, the 
Court reasoned that “[i]t is not open to doubt that the commission of crime 
. . . has some relation to the question of character.”
151
 The Court 
acknowledged the possibility that “one who has violated the criminal law 
may thereafter reform, and become in fact possessed of a good moral 
character,” but ruled that New York was nonetheless entitled to “prescribe 
a rule of general application based upon a state of things.”
152
 In Schware 
v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, the Supreme Court was far less 
deferential to a Board of Bar Examiners’ determination that the plaintiff’s 
past disqualified him from practicing law.
153
 The Court cautioned that, 
although a state can require standards such as good moral character before 
it admits an applicant to the bar, “any qualification must have a rational 
 
 
 147. Parker v. Lyons, 757 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that felons are not a suspect 
class); Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 587 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that sex offenders are not a 
suspect class). 
 148. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988). 
 149. See, e.g., Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077, 1080 (D. Conn. 1977) (striking down as 
unconstitutional a statute that prohibited ex-felons from obtaining a license to work as a private 
detective or security guard because its “across-the-board disqualification fail[ed] to consider probable 
and realistic circumstances in a felon’s life”). 
 150. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
 151. Id. at 196. 
 152. Id. at 197. 
 153. 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 
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connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice law.”
154
 The 
Court then engaged in a highly individualized assessment of the plaintiff’s 
past and ultimately concluded there was no evidence to rationally justify a 
finding that the plaintiff was unfit to practice law.
155
 Just three years later, 
in De Veau v. Braisted, the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute that 
prohibited ex-felons from collecting dues on behalf of a waterfront 
union.
156
 This time the Court focused on the broader “context of the 
structure and history of the legislation of which it [was] a part”
157
—
namely, the corruption and dishonesty that had infested the waterfront, in 
part because of the “presence on the waterfront of convicted felons in 
many influential positions.”
158
 The Court noted that in enacting this 
exclusion, “New York was not guessing or indulging in airy assumptions . 
. . . It was acting on impressive if mortifying evidence that the presence on 
the waterfront of ex-convicts was an important contributing factor to the 
corrupt waterfront situation.”
159
  
Lower courts generally follow the Supreme Court’s lead in validating 
laws and policies that bar ex-offenders from employment, so long as they 
are somewhat narrowly tailored to specific types of offenders or 
governmental interests. Hill v. City of Chester illustrates just how 
deferential courts can be to state action excluding ex-offenders from 
employment.
160
 In that case, Robert Hill served two prison sentences when 
he was younger: one for homicide charges when he was fourteen years old 
and the other for engaging in intercourse with a minor.
161
 While 
incarcerated, he earned his GED and acquired office skills; following his 
release, he pursued a career as a legal secretary, earned respect in the legal 
community, married and had three children, and even became a 
minister.
162
 After the mayor appointed Hill as her administrative assistant, 
various constituents protested the appointment and pressured the city 
council to terminate Hill’s employment.
163
 Although the city council did 
not have the authority to discharge Hill, it voted to set his salary at zero, 
 
 
 154. Id. at 239. 
 155. Id. at 239–47. 
 156. 363 U.S. 144 (1960). 
 157. Id. at 147. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 159–60. 
 160. No. CIV. A. 92-4357, 1994 WL 463405 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1994), aff’d, 60 F.3d 815 (3d Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 914 (1995). 
 161. Id. at *1. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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effectively ending his employment.
164
 In the lawsuit that followed, the 
court granted the City summary judgment based on its determination that 
the City’s actions were justified by its “legitimate purpose of promoting 
high standards of professional conduct in the position of Administrative 
Assistant to the Mayor because of the sensitivity and importance of the 
position.”
165
 It further noted that the City had the right to be concerned 
that protests about Hill’s employment could jeopardize the functioning of 
the City government.
166
 The court seemed to adopt the “once a felon, 
always a felon” rationale, stating as fact that “persons who have 
committed serious crimes in the past have demonstrated a ‘greater 
potential for abuse’ of rights and privileges.’”
167
  
Other examples of state actions that have passed constitutional muster 
include a prohibition against issuing certain types of insurance licenses to 
ex-felons,
168
 school district bans on hiring ex-felons into some teaching 
positions,
169
 an ordinance allowing the revocation of taxi licenses for 
certain crimes,
170
 the denial of a license to operate a child-care facility to a 
person convicted of a violent crime,
171
 a ban on employing parole officers 
with prior felony convictions,
172
 the discharge of a city firefighter for a 
prior arson conviction,
173
 a prohibition on private detective agencies 
 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at *5. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Heller v. Ross, 682 F. Supp. 2d 797, 803 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (holding that the state had a legitimate interest in denying insurance licenses to ex-felons 
because “it is rational to conclude that applicants who have been convicted of felonies are more likely 
to violate their legal, and fiduciary, obligations to their clients”).  
 169. Crook v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 277 F. App’x 477, 481 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a 
school board’s policy barring ex-felons from permanent teaching positions reflected “the legitimate 
interest of protecting children from both physical harm and corrupt influences”); Hilliard v. Ferguson, 
30 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994) (same). 
 170. M & Z Cab Corp. v. City of Chicago, 18 F. Supp. 2d 941, 951 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that 
the city had a “legitimate interest in protecting the public from those with criminal propensities”). 
 171. Lopez v. McMahon, 253 Cal. Rptr. 321, 325 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a statute 
disqualifying individuals with certain types of felony convictions from operating a day-care facility 
was “rationally related to the legislative purpose to protect day care children against risk of harm”). 
 172. Dallara v. Sinnott, No. 1:98-CV-3472-ENVCLP, 2006 WL 1582159, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 
2006) (finding that “parole officers have a unique ability to exercise awesome authority on their own 
split second judgment,” and that New York had “a legitimate interest in hiring qualified individuals of 
high moral character who have a background likely to inspire public confidence and respect”).  
 173. Carlyle v. Sitterson, 438 F. Supp. 956, 963 (E.D.N.C. 1975) (holding that a fire department 
did not act capriciously in discharging the plaintiff because his arson conviction was “directly 
antithetical to the duties of a fireman”). 
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employing convicted felons for ten years,
174
 and the denial of a license to 
operate a dance hall to an ex-felon.
175
 
By contrast, courts tend to strike down blanket or otherwise overbroad 
employment exclusions. For example, in Barletta v. Rilling, the district 
court invalidated Connecticut’s statutory ban on issuing precious metals 
licenses to ex-felons.
176
 The court acknowledged the state had a 
reasonable interest in eliminating fraud in the precious metals trade,
177
 but 
determined there was no rational nexus between “any and every felony 
offense and the fitness to act as a precious metals dealer.”
178
 The court 
pointed out that many felonies, such as mishandling environmental 
pollutants and draft dodging, were not related to precious metals dealing, 
whereas many misdemeanors—which were not included under the ban—
“reflect conduct that seems to be more relevant to the state’s legitimate 
goals.”
179
 The court further noted that the statute also failed to “distinguish 
among felons in terms of when they were convicted and how severely they 
were sentenced,” and “prohibit[ed] consideration of the nature and severity 
of the crime, the nature and circumstances of an applicant’s involvement 
in the crime, the time elapsed since conviction, and the degree of the 
applicant’s rehabilitation.”
180
  
Similarly, in Smith v. Fussenich, the district court struck down a 
Connecticut statute banning ex-felons from employment as private 
detectives or security guards.
181
 The court reasoned that the statute 
“fail[ed] to recognize the obvious differences in the fitness and character 
of those persons with felony records,” and that crimes such as bigamy and 
tax evasion “have virtually no relevance to an individual’s performance as 
a private detective or security guard.”
182
 The court further noted that the 
statute’s blanket prohibition failed to take into account the “probable and 
realistic circumstances in a felon’s life, including the likelihood of 
 
 
 174. Schanuel v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 316, 320 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the statutory ban was 
constitutional because it was “more closely tailored to the state’s legitimate interest in a competent and 
reliable workforce in the sensitive area of detective work”). 
 175. Darks v. City of Cincinnati, 745 F.2d 1040, 1043 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that the ordinance 
furthered the city’s interests in “insuring that dance halls are operated by persons of integrity” and that 
dance hall owners “will abide by and enforce liquor and tax collection laws”).  
 176. 973 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Conn. 2013). 
 177. Id. at 136. 
 178. Id. at 138. 
 179. Id. at 138–39. 
 180. Id. at 139. 
 181. 440 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (D. Conn. 1977). 
 182. Id. at 1080. 
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rehabilitation, age at the time of conviction, and other mitigating 
circumstances related to the nature of the crime and degree of 
participation.”
183
  
Other examples of state actions that have been deemed unconstitutional 
include bans on contracting with towing companies whose owners have a 
criminal record,
184
 the denial of a teaching credential to a community 
college instructor because of a misdemeanor conviction,
185
 general 
exclusions from state and municipal employment,
186
 the denial of a license 
to sell vehicles,
187
 and a lifetime ban from working for the Massachusetts 
Health and Human Services Agency.
188
 
B. Title VII Cases 
Title VII provides some relief to ex-offenders who are discriminated 
against in employment, but only in very limited cases. The statute 
prohibits disparate treatment and disparate impact in the employment of 
ex-offenders, but only if it is somehow tied to race, color, sex, national 
 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. Lewis v. Ala. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 831 F. Supp. 824, 827 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (holding that a 
prohibition on contracting with tow owners with misdemeanor convictions involving moral turpitude 
was “totally irrational and inconsistent” with the Equal Protection Clause); Gregg v. Lawson, 732 F. 
Supp. 849, 856 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (“The Court is simply not convinced at this point that a legitimate 
State interest is served by such a broad rule that provides no procedure to determine whether in a 
particular case its application to a person who has previously been utilized by the State for providing 
wrecker services is justified, fair, and rational.”). 
 185. Newland v. Bd. of Governors, 566 P.2d 254, 258 (Cal. 1977) (“The Legislature could not 
possibly or sensibly have concluded that misdemeanants, as opposed to felons, constitute a class of 
particularly incorrigible offenders who are beyond hope of rehabilitation.”). 
 186. Furst v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 631 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that the 
employer’s policy dismissing all employees with a felony conviction was “simply too broad to 
accomplish any legitimate governmental purpose”); Kindem v. City of Alameda, 502 F. Supp. 1108, 
1112 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (“[I]t has not been demonstrated that the sole fact of a single prior felony 
conviction renders an individual unfit for public employment, regardless of the type of crime 
committed or the type of job sought.”); Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573, 580 (S.D. Iowa 1974) 
(stating that although Iowa “could logically prohibit and refuse employment in certain positions where 
the felony conviction would directly reflect on the felon’s qualifications for the job,” the state’s 
blanket prohibition against the employment of ex-felons in civil service positions was not sufficiently 
tailored to “conform to what might be legitimate state interests”). 
 187. Brewer v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 155 Cal. Rptr. 643, 649 (Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s conviction for inappropriate relations with a child was not rationally related to his fitness for 
selling vehicles). 
 188. Cronin v. O’Leary, No. 00-1713-F, 2001 WL 919969, at *3-7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 9, 
2001) (holding that a lifetime ban on employment for certain convictions was a violation of due 
process). 
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origin, or religion.
189
 As with constitutional challenges, the relevant 
inquiry under Title VII is whether the policy or practice bears some 
reasonable relation to a particular job. In disparate treatment cases an 
employer must proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the 
adverse action,
190
 whereas in disparate impact cases the employer must 
prove its exclusionary practice is “job related for the position in question 
and consistent with business necessity.”
191
  
1. Disparate Treatment Claims 
To prove disparate treatment, a plaintiff generally must first establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination by showing: “(1) he is a member of a 
protected class, (2) he met his employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) he 
suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the circumstances give 
rise to an inference of discrimination.”
192
 The burden then shifts to the 
employer to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
action, after which the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove the 
employer’s proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination.
193
 For an ex-
offender to prevail on a disparate treatment claim, he must prove the 
employer treated criminal history information differently for different 
persons based on a Title VII-protected characteristic. In its Enforcement 
Guidance, the EEOC gives the example of two similarly qualified 
applicants, one white and one black, who both have convictions for 
distributing marijuana as high school students.
194
 If the employer denies 
the black candidate an interview based on his criminal record but 
interviews the white candidate, the employer has treated the ex-offenders 
differently based on race in violation of Title VII.
195
  
 
 
 189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2013); EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § III.C; 
see also Mullings, supra note 5, at 281 (arguing that tying criminality to race under Title VII 
“reinforce[s] stereotypes of criminality and deepen[s] antipathy toward providing protection to ex-
offenders, and African American and Hispanic ex-offenders in particular”). 
 190. See, e.g., Johnson v. Pub. Servs. Enter. Grp., 529 F. App’x 188, 192 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming 
summary judgment for employer where employer’s inability to verify the applicant’s criminal history 
constituted a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for revoking a conditional offer of employment). 
 191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2013). 
 192. Young v. Builders Steel Co., 754 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2014). This burden-shifting 
framework does not apply to cases in which a plaintiff has direct evidence of discrimination. See Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121–22 (1985). 
 193. Young, 754 F.3d at 577–78. 
 194. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § IV. 
 195. Id. 
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Disparate treatment cases involving ex-offenders are most notable for 
their extreme deference to employers. For example, in Strong v. Orkand 
Corporation, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff could not even make 
out a prima facie case of discrimination because his criminal record 
rendered him unqualified for the position at issue as a matter of law.
196
 
The court made no mention of what crimes the plaintiff had committed, 
when he had committed them, or how they related to the job, but instead 
appeared simply to take the employer’s word for it.
197
 Even where an ex-
offender does establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the courts 
have held—often with little or no discussion—that taking an adverse 
action against an applicant or employee because of the individual’s 
criminal record constitutes a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the 
employment decision.
198
 At the pretext stage, courts rarely scrutinize 
whether the exclusion was justified in light of safety or performance 
concerns or the ex-offender’s individual circumstances; instead, they tend 
to focus on factors unrelated to the ex-offender herself, such as how 
strictly the employer followed its policies
199
 or whether the employer was 
consistent in its treatment of comparators.
200
  
2. Disparate Impact Claims 
Unlike disparate treatment cases, where a court’s primary focus is on 
whether the employer’s criminal record policy was consistently applied, in 
disparate impact cases courts carefully scrutinize whether the policy itself 
is justifiable. To prevail on a disparate impact claim, an ex-offender must 
show that an employer’s facially neutral criminal record policy 
 
 
 196. 83 F. App’x 751, 753 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Hickox & Roehling, supra note 92, at 240 (citations omitted) (“The courts have consistently 
held that not hiring an applicant or terminating an employee because of the individual’s criminal 
record is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. Courts typically reach this conclusion with little or no 
discussion.”); see also, e.g., Crawford v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 245 F. App’x 369, 378–79 (5th 
Cir. 2007) (holding, with almost no analysis, that the plaintiff’s prior workplace misconduct and 
criminal record constituted legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the government’s refusal to hire 
her as an immigration inspector). 
 199. See, e.g., Barrow v. Terminix Int’l Co., No. 3:07-cv-324, 2009 WL 243093, at *12 (S.D. 
Ohio Jan. 29, 2009) (denying summary judgment to employer because there was no evidence that it 
followed its own policy in considering “the nature and seriousness of the crimes, the date of conviction 
and the relation to the position sought”). 
 200. See, e.g., Noble v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 07-CV-5832, 2009 WL 2391864, at *8-9 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2009) (granting employer summary judgment where the plaintiff and proposed 
comparator were not similarly situated, in part because the plaintiff’s conviction was very recent, and 
the comparator’s conviction was nine years old). 
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disproportionately impacts some individuals protected under Title VII.
201
 
An employer can defeat a disparate impact claim by showing the 
exclusionary policy is job related and consistent with business 
necessity.
202
  
The foundational disparate impact case involving ex-offenders is Green 
v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company.
203
 Buck Green, a black man who 
served twenty-one months in prison for refusing military induction, 
brought a disparate impact claim against the Railroad for denying his 
application for a clerk position pursuant to its policy of refusing to employ 
any person convicted of a crime other than a minor traffic offense.
204
 
Having determined the Railroad’s policy disproportionately disqualified 
blacks, the court considered whether the policy was job related and 
consistent with business necessity.
205
 The Railroad identified several 
reasons its policy was necessary: fear of cargo theft, handling company 
funds, bonding qualifications, the possible impeachment of an employee 
as a witness, negligent hiring liability, employment disruption due to 
recidivism, and an alleged lack of moral character of persons with 
convictions.
206
 The court noted that although these reasons could “serve as 
relevant considerations in making individual hiring decisions, they in no 
way justif[ied] an absolute policy which sweeps so broadly.”
207
 In a post-
remand appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed an injunction permitting the 
Railroad’s use of criminal convictions as a factor in its employment 
decisions, so long as the Railroad considered three factors: the nature and 
gravity of the offense, how much time had elapsed since the offense or the 
completion of the sentence, and the nature of the job held or sought.
208
 
For decades, courts have incorporated Green’s three factors into their 
analysis of whether criminal record exclusions are job related and 
consistent with business necessity.
209
 The EEOC likewise has integrated 
 
 
 201. Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing Gen. Bldg. 
Contractors Ass’n. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 387–88 (1982)). 
 202. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578–79 (2009). 
 203. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 204. Id. at 1292–93. 
 205. Id. at 1294–95. 
 206. Id. at 1298. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 549 F.2d 1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 209. See, e.g., Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs., 941 F. Supp. 2d 884, 889–90 (S.D. Ohio 2013) 
(denying school district’s motion to dismiss based on determination that policy banning individuals 
with certain convictions from employment did not constitute a business necessity as a matter of law 
because the offenses at issue were remote in time, one of the offenses was “insubstantial,” and both 
plaintiffs had demonstrated “decades of good performance”); Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 522 F. Supp. 
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the Green factors into its various policies and guidance on criminal 
convictions.
210
 However, in 2007, the Third Circuit sent shockwaves 
through the business world by imposing a more rigorous assessment of 
business necessity in El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority (“SEPTA”).
211
 The case involved a disparate impact challenge 
to SEPTA’s criminal conviction policy, which prohibited drivers of its 
paratransit busses from having certain convictions.
212
 Douglas El brought 
suit against SEPTA after he was denied a paratransit driver position 
because of a forty-year-old, second-degree homicide conviction for his 
role in a gang-related fight when he was fifteen years old.
213
 He served 
three-and-a-half years in prison.
214
 Although the court affirmed summary 
judgment for SEPTA, it made clear it had serious “reservations” about 
SEPTA’s policy.
215
  
The court centered its analysis on the issue of risk, noting that hiring 
policies “ultimately concern the management of risk,” and that although 
Title VII “does not ask the impossible” of employers in measuring risk 
perfectly, “[i]t does . . . require that the policy under review accurately 
distinguish between applicants that pose an unacceptable level of risk and 
those that do not.”
216
 Crucially, the court interpreted various Supreme 
Court disparate impact cases as “refus[ing] to accept bare or ‘common-
sense’-based assertions of business necessity and instead requir[ing] some 
level of empirical proof that challenged hiring criteria accurately predicted 
job performance.”
217
 The court concluded from these cases that 
“employers cannot rely on rough-cut measures of employment-related 
qualities; rather, they must tailor their criteria to measure those qualities 
 
 
1283, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that evidence showed the employer did not consider an 
applicant’s conviction in isolation “but in the context of the [individual’s] overall qualifications and 
employment record”). But see EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 752 (S.D. 
Fla. 1989) (observing that Green was “ill founded” because it could be “broadly read to bar all 
employment conviction policies”). 
 210. See, e.g., EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § V.B.1 (identifying the Green 
factors as relevant to the question of job relatedness and business necessity); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC POLICY STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF CONVICTION RECORDS UNDER 
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1987), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/ 
convict1.html (replacing prior analytical framework with Green factors). 
 211. 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 212. Id. at 236. 
 213. Id. at 235–36. 
 214. Id. at 236. 
 215. Id. at 235. 
 216. Id. at 244–45. 
 217. Id. at 240. 
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accurately and directly for each applicant.”
218
 The court likewise 
interpreted Supreme Court precedent as rejecting “more is better-style 
reasoning,” whereby an employer may try to justify its exclusionary policy 
based on “some abstract notion that more of a given quality is better.”
219
 
In so doing, the court implicitly rejected Green’s three-factor test and the 
EEOC’s formulation of the business necessity defense and instead 
demanded empirically-backed evidence to justify exclusionary 
employment policies.
220
  
The case ultimately turned on the fact that SEPTA produced empirical 
evidence to justify its policy, which El did not refute.
221
 A renowned 
expert on recidivism testified that although an individual’s likelihood of 
recidivating decreases the longer he stays free from criminal activity, the 
individual cannot “be judged to be less or equally likely to commit a future 
violent act than comparable individuals who have no prior violent 
history.”
222
 The expert testified that although the risk differential might be 
small, making predictions about comparable low-probability events would 
be “extremely difficult.”
223
 Based on this testimony, the court concluded 
that even though the probability El would recidivate after forty years of 
living crime free was small, it was sufficient to justify SEPTA’s policy, 
“given the marked sensitivity of the paratransit position at issue.”
224
 A 
second expert witness testified that “disabled people are proportionately 
more likely than others to be the victims of violent or sexual crimes,” and 
that “employees of transportation providers commit a disproportionate 
share of those crimes against disabled people.”
225
 He further testified that 
the predictive power of past violent criminal activity “moderates over time 
but remains regardless of how much time passes.”
226
 From this, the court 
determined that SEPTA’s decision to screen out applicants with violent 
convictions, no matter how remote, was appropriate in light of the 
extraordinarily sensitive nature of the paratransit driver position.
227
  
 
 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 220. Id. at 243–45. 
 221. Id. at 247–48. 
 222. Id. at 246. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 247. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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Although the court expressed skepticism about the validity of the 
expert testimony,
228
 the absence of any counterevidence left it “little 
choice” but to uphold SEPTA’s policy.
229
 In the court’s view, had El 
“hired an expert who testified that there is [a] time at which a former 
criminal is no longer any more likely to recidivate than the average 
person”—a redemption point
230
—it would have been “a different case.”
231
 
El marks a serious departure from past judicial treatment of criminal 
exclusion policies. Although the Third Circuit ultimately upheld SEPTA’s 
policy, the decision warns that employers can no longer rely on 
stereotypical assumptions about ex-offenders, but must analyze the risk 
both quantitatively and qualitatively to prove business necessity.  
3. EEOC Guidance 
The El decision prompted the EEOC to reevaluate its policy statements 
on employers’ consideration of criminal records
232
 and issue new 
guidance that updated, consolidated, and superseded all of its previous 
policy statements on the issue.
233
 The Enforcement Guidance is 
noteworthy in several regards. First, the EEOC distinguishes between 
arrest and conviction records, cautioning that unlike a criminal conviction, 
which “will usually serve as sufficient evidence that a person engaged in 
particular conduct,”
234
 “an arrest record standing alone may not be used to 
deny an employment opportunity” because an arrest is not proof of 
criminal conduct.
235
 Although the EEOC does not consider an exclusion 
based on an arrest record alone to be job related and consistent with 
business necessity, the Commission acknowledges an arrest may “trigger 
 
 
 228. Id. (“This is not to say that we are convinced that SEPTA’s expert reports are ironclad in the 
abstract.”). 
 229. Id.  
 230. See supra Part I.C. 
 231. El, 479 F.3d at 247. 
 232. See Questions and Answers About the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration 
of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title VII, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www1.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/qa_arrest_conviction.cfm?renderfor 
print=1 (last visited Aug. 28, 2015) (stating that the EEOC decided to reevaluate existing policies, in 
part because of the Third Circuit’s suggestion in El that “the Commission should provide in-depth 
legal analysis and updated research on this issue”); see also El, 479 F.3d at 244 (concluding the 
EEOC’s guidelines were not “entitled to great deference,” and that although “the EEOC’s policy was 
rewritten to bring it in line with the Green case . . . the policy document itself d[id] not substantively 
analyze the statute”). 
 233. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § II. 
 234. Id. § V.B.3. 
 235. Id. § V.B.2. 
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an inquiry into whether the conduct underlying the arrest justifies an 
adverse employment action.”
236
 If such conduct renders a person unfit for 
the position, the employer may make an employment decision on that 
basis.
237
 
The Enforcement Guidance also details the EEOC’s position on how an 
employer can prove a criminal record exclusion is job related and 
consistent with business necessity. If data about criminal conduct and 
subsequent work performance is available, an employer can prove the 
defense by validating the criminal conduct screen in accordance with the 
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.
238
 Because such 
data are relatively scarce, a more feasible option for most employers is to 
develop “a targeted screen considering at least the nature of the crime, the 
time elapsed, and the nature of the job” (the Green factors), and then 
provide “an opportunity for an individualized assessment for people 
excluded by the screen to determine whether the policy as applied is job 
related and consistent with business necessity.”
239
 The individualized 
assessment should allow the person an opportunity to explain why the 
exclusion should not apply in her case.
240
 Mitigating individualized 
evidence may include proof that the ex-offender was not correctly 
identified in the criminal record, the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the offense, the number of offenses on the person’s record, age at the time 
of conviction or release from prison, evidence that the person performed 
similar work post-conviction without any issues, the length and 
consistency of the person’s employment history before and after the 
offense, rehabilitation efforts, employment and character references, and 
whether the individual is bonded.
241
 
A final point of emphasis in the Enforcement Guidance is the EEOC’s 
endorsement of banning criminal history questions from employment 
applications as a best practice.
242
 The EEOC urges employers to “not ask 
about convictions on job applications,” and recommends that any 
subsequent inquiries into the person’s criminal record “be limited to 
 
 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. § V.B.4; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (2015) (describing the general standards for validity 
studies).  
 239. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § V.B.4. 
 240. Id. § V.B.9. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. § V.B.3. 
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convictions for which exclusion would be job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity.”
243
 
The EEOC has made criminal records policies that disparately impact 
Title VII-protected groups a litigation priority in recent years.
244
 Although 
the EEOC has yet to prevail in court,
245
 it successfully pressured Pepsi 
into a widely publicized $3.1 million settlement to resolve the agency’s 
claim that the beverage giant’s criminal policy unfairly weeded out black 
applicants.
246
 More recently, BMW Manufacturing Company agreed to 
pay $1.6 million to settle a lawsuit in which the EEOC claimed the 
company’s criminal background policy was unlawful because it excluded 
from employment any individual with a conviction for certain categories 
of crimes, regardless of the length of time since the conviction or whether 
the conviction was for a misdemeanor or felony.
247
 The EEOC’s 
aggressive actions of late prompted attorneys general from nine states to 
pen a scathing letter to the EEOC Commissioners in which they referred to 
the agency’s litigation tactics as “quintessential example[s] of gross 
federal overreach.”
248
 In 2013, Texas took more drastic action by seeking 
a declaratory judgment in federal court that the Enforcement Guidance is 
 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. See EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783, 786 (D. Md. 2013) (noting that in addition to 
this case, the EEOC had recently filed similar lawsuits against Dollar General Corp. and BMW); see 
also Scott Thurm, Employment Checks Fuel Race Complaints, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2013, at A1, 
available at www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323495604578539283518855020 (stating that 
EEOC lawsuits against Dollar General and BMW “underscore increasing government scrutiny of 
criminal and credit checks”). 
 245. See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT 09cv2573, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118307, at *1-2, 
*54 (D. Md. Sept. 3, 2015) (ordering EEOC to pay attorneys’ fees of nearly one million dollars based 
on faulty claim that the defendant’s criminal background check policy disparately impacted 
minorities); EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., 732 F.3d 584, 591–92 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming district 
court’s order that the EEOC pay over $750,000 in attorney and expert fees and costs after agency’s 
disparate impact claim failed); EEOC v. FAPS, Inc., Civil No. 10-3095 (JAP)(DEA), 2014 WL 
4798802, at *16–22 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2014) (granting summary judgment to employer on disparate 
impact claim, but allowing pattern or practice claim to go forward). 
 246. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Pepsi to Pay $3.13 Million and Made 
Major Policy Changes to Resolve EEOC Finding of Nationwide Hiring Discrimination Against 
African Americans (Jan. 11, 2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-11-
12a.cfm. 
 247. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, BMW to Pay $1.6 Million and Offer 
Jobs to Settle Federal Race Discrimination Lawsuit (Sept. 8, 2015), available at http://eeoc.gov/ 
eeoc/newsroom/release/9-8-15.cfm. 
 248. Letter from State Attorneys Gen. to U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’rs (July 24, 2013), 
available at http://www.esrcheck.com/file/Atty-General-Criticism-of-EEOC_2013-7-24.pdf; see also 
Letter from Jacqueline A. Berrien, Chair, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, to State Attorneys 
Gen. (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/upload/EEOC-
Response-to-AG-Letter.pdf (responding to Attorneys General).  
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unlawful and unenforceable.
249
 The case was ultimately dismissed based 
on the district court’s determination that the Enforcement Guidance is 
merely a guideline, not a final agency action.
250
 Texas has appealed the 
judgment to the Fifth Circuit.
251
 
C. Negligent Hiring Cases 
Unlike constitutional and Title VII challenges, negligent hiring claims 
tend to hinder, rather than promote, ex-offender employment. In recent 
years, companies have been slapped with multimillion-dollar verdicts—
and a spate of bad publicity—for unwittingly hiring employees with 
questionable backgrounds who subsequently harm others.
252
 The prospect 
of a negligent hiring lawsuit understandably makes some employers 
uneasy about employing anyone they believe may have a propensity for 
violence or dishonesty. Consequently, ex-offenders often stand little 
chance of being hired—especially over non-offenders—because 
employers rely on past criminal conduct as a predictor of future 
misconduct. Despite their negative effect on ex-offender employment, 
negligent hiring cases are useful in considering how accountable an 
employer should be for hiring a person with a criminal record. 
The tort of negligent hiring is designed to motivate employers to hire 
competent and safe employees by holding employers liable for the tortious 
conduct of an employee against third parties, including coworkers, 
customers, and other members of the public.
253
 Although the tort varies 
 
 
 249. See generally Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Texas v. EEOC, No. 5:13-cv-
00255-C (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2013). 
 250. See Order at 7-8, Texas v. EEOC, No. 5:13-cv-00255-C (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2014). 
 251. See generally Notice of Appeal, Texas v. EEOC, No. 14-10949 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2014). 
 252. Mary L. Connerley et al., Criminal Background Checks for Prospective and Current 
Employees: Current Practices Among Municipal Agencies, 30 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 173, 174 
(2001) (employers lose approximately 72% of negligent hiring cases, with the average settlement over 
$1.6 million); see also, e.g., Oregon Jury Renders $5.2M Verdict Against Trucking Broker and Driver 
in Negligent Hiring Case, PRWEB (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/3/prweb 
9258166.htm (discussing a $5.2 million judgment against a transportation broker after its driver fell 
asleep while under the influence of methamphetamine and caused an accident that killed a man); Press 
Release, Langdon & Emison, Langdon & Emison Obtains $7 Million Verdict in Trial over Trucking 
Accident (Nov. 11, 2011), available at http://www.langdonemison.com/newsroom/langdon--emison-
obtains-7-million-verdict-in-trial-over-trucking-accident (discussing a $7 million judgment against a 
trucking company that employed a driver who caused a fatal accident based on the company’s failure 
to perform a background check that would have shown the driver had received two license 
revocations). 
 253. Shawn D. Vance, How Reforming the Tort of Negligent Hiring Can Enhance the Economic 
Activity of a State, Be Good for Business and Protect the Victims of Certain Crimes, 6 LEGIS. & POL’Y 
BRIEF 171, 176 (2014). 
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from state to state,
254
 in general it allows a victim of an employee’s 
tortious conduct to seek remedies from the employer if the employer knew 
or should have known of the employee’s potential risk to cause harm or if 
the risk could have been discovered through reasonable investigation.
255
 
Unlike the doctrine of respondeat superior, the tort of negligent hiring 
generally does not require that the tortious conduct occurred within the 
scope and course of the employee’s employment.
256
  
Negligent hiring cases often turn on whether the employer knew or 
should have known that the employee posed an unreasonable risk. Courts 
do not apply a bright-line test in assessing this factor; instead, “[t]he scope 
of [an employer’s] investigation is directly related to the severity of risk 
third parties are subjected to by an incompetent employee.”
257
 Thus, it 
may be unreasonable for an employer not to conduct a criminal 
background search for certain positions but not others. In Stacy v. HRB 
Tax Group, Inc., the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment for H&R 
Block on a negligent hiring claim brought by former clients whose 
identities were stolen by one of the company’s tax preparers.
258
 The court 
could not comprehend why the company did not perform a background 
check on someone who would have unfettered access to clients’ financial 
information, noting that had the employer conducted even a “minimal 
investigation,” it would have discovered the employee’s multiple 
convictions for identity theft and using computers to commit a crime.
259
 
By contrast, in Keen v. Miller Environmental Group, Inc., the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed summary judgment for an employer that did not conduct a 
background check on an employee who later raped a coworker after giving 
her a ride home from work.
260
 The court emphasized that the employee 
 
 
 254. Id. at 181–99 (providing a state-by-state review of negligent hiring laws). 
 255. Kelly M. Feeley, Hiring Sexters to Teach Children: Creating Predictable and Flexible 
Standards for Negligent Hiring in Schools, 42 N.M. L. REV. 83, 89 (2012); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958) (“A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents 
is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless . . . in the 
employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving risk of harm to others . . . .”); 
id. § 213 cmt. d (stating that the basis for such liability is that “the employer antecedently had reason 
to believe that an undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment,” and thus, “under the 
circumstances, the employer has not taken the care which a prudent man would take in selecting the 
person for the business in hand”). 
 256. Rodolfo A. Camacho, How to Avoid Negligent Hiring Litigation, 14 WHITTIER L. REV. 787, 
792 (1993). 
 257. Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 913 (Minn. 1983). 
 258. 516 F. App’x 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 259. Id. at 589. 
 260. 702 F.3d 239, 249–50 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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was hired as a laborer to remove tar balls from the Gulf Coast, and that 
there was “[n]othing about the nature of that work [that] could have 
suggested . . . [the employee] was likely to subject [a coworker] to the risk 
of assault.”
261
 “If a criminal background check were necessary to screen 
for indicia that a manual laborer might assault a co-worker,” the court 
reasoned, “it is difficult to envision a fact pattern in which a background 
check would not be necessary.”
262
 
Courts consider a variety of factors in assessing the foreseeability of an 
employee’s tortious conduct. In most states, foreseeability depends on the 
extent and nature of an employee’s criminal history and “the nexus . . . 
between the prior acts and the ultimate harm caused.”
263
 But courts are 
inconsistent at best in their analyses. Sometimes courts hold employers 
liable based on fairly unrelated past criminal behavior,
264
 and other times 
they discount prior criminal acts for not being almost identical to the 
conduct underlying the negligent hiring claim.
265
 In other states, courts 
tend to focus on the totality of the circumstances that would indicate an 
unreasonable risk of harm.
266
 Such circumstances can be wide ranging and 
include anything from an offending employee’s past positive experiences 
working under similar conditions
267
 to professional opinions about an 
 
 
 261. Id. at 246. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Stacy A. Hickox, Employer Liability for Negligent Hiring of Ex-Offenders, 55 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1001, 1007–08 (2011) (quoting Doe v. ATC, Inc., 624 S.E.2d 447, 450 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 264. See, e.g., Hines v. Aandahl Constr. Co., No. A05-1634, 2006 WL 2598031, at *1-3 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2006) (upholding jury verdict against contractor whose employee robbed and 
assaulted homeowners, where employee had no history of violence but did have a record of chemical 
dependence and theft); Spencer v. Health Force, Inc., 107 P.3d 504, 512 (N.M. 2005) (finding that the 
employer could be held liable for employee’s fatal injection of a patient with heroin based on 
employee’s criminal record, which included aggravated assault and armed robbery convictions). 
 265. See, e.g., Stalbosky v. Belew, 205 F.3d 890, 892–97 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming summary 
judgment for trucking company because it was not reasonably foreseeable that driver with prior 
convictions for arson and aggravated assault would later rape and murder motorist); Prewitt v. Alexson 
Servs., Inc., No. 2007-09-218, 2008 WL 3893575, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2008) (holding that 
the employer could not be held liable for sexual assault of coworker by employee with record of 
indecent exposure, where exposure was not a physical assault and assailant received treatment for 
mental illness and was cleared by his doctor to return to work); Kirlin v. Halverson, 758 N.W.2d 436, 
453 (S.D. 2008) (refusing to hold employer liable for assault committed by employee with prior 
conviction for resisting arrest in connection with a domestic violence situation, as well as arrests for 
assault, grand theft, and traffic violations). 
 266. Hickox, supra note 263, at 1008. 
 267. See, e.g., Estevez-Yalcin v. Children’s Village, No. 01-CV-8784 (KMK), 2006 WL 1643274, 
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2006) (finding the children’s home not liable for mentor’s molestation of 
resident because mentor had no prior record of inappropriate behavior, had worked well with children 
in the past, and was certified by two agencies to board a child). 
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offender’s suitability for employment.
268
 Because juries rather than courts 
typically decide issues of foreseeability, the case law provides limited 
guidance to employers seeking to avoid a negligent hiring lawsuit.
269
 
III. AMENDING TITLE VII 
Given the size of the United States’ ex-offender population and its 
dismal recidivism rate, it is no longer tenable to allow employers 
unfettered discretion to discriminate against ex-offenders. Although the 
number of states enacting laws to protect ex-offenders in the workplace is 
growing, those states remain a small minority in comparison to states 
where discrimination against ex-offenders is permitted. Moreover, even 
among states that have adopted laws to protect ex-offenders, the types and 
levels of protection vary widely, as do the legal tests and standards 
interpreting those protections.
270
 Workplace discrimination against ex-
offenders is a nationwide problem, and therefore demands a national 
solution.
271
 Federal legislation would not only bring much-needed 
consistency to this issue, but would also signal a national commitment to 
facilitating ex-offender reentry. This part advocates for three amendments 
to Title VII that would increase the employment of ex-offenders without 
unduly burdening employers or the public. Calls to amend Title VII in this 
regard have been scarce.
272
 Yet Title VII exists primarily to protect 
vulnerable populations whose opportunities in the labor market 
historically have been limited by discrimination,
273
 and thus, it is well 
suited to protect ex-offenders from unwarranted discrimination. Moreover, 
amending Title VII would likely require less time and fewer resources 
than writing a new law, and would also offer the added benefit of existing 
 
 
 268. See, e.g., Coughlin v. Titus & Bean Graphics, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 106, 112 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2002) (finding that employer was entitled to rely on doctors’ professional evaluations in employing ex-
offender who subsequently committed murder). 
 269. Hickox, supra note 263, at 1004. 
 270. See infra note 281. 
 271. Mullings, supra note 5, at 286 (arguing that a federal statute is arguably the best solution 
because the barriers to the employment of ex-offenders affect the national economy). 
 272. See, e.g., Jennifer Leavitt, Walking a Tightrope: Balancing Competing Public Interests in the 
Employment of Criminal Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1312–13 (2002). 
 273. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The language of Title VII 
makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate 
those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered . . . stratified job environments to the 
disadvantage of minority citizens.”); Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a 
Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 62 (1999) (“Title VII was 
enacted primarily to remedy discrimination against members of groups that had historically been 
excluded from equal access to social, political, and economic power.”). 
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judicial analysis and EEOC guidance on the treatment of criminal records 
under the statute. 
Amending Title VII is not without its challenges. Aside from 
opposition from employers and some members of the public, perhaps the 
biggest issue is how the amendments would affect existing state and 
federal laws and regulations pertaining to the employment and licensing of 
ex-offenders. The amendments to Title VII would preempt inconsistent 
state employment discrimination and negligent hiring laws,
274
 but would 
not affect state statutes and regulations governing the licensure of ex-
offenders in certain occupations.
275
 The amendments likewise would not 
affect federal statutes that limit the employment or licensure of ex-
offenders. Although amending Title VII would be a major step forward for 
ex-offenders, both state and federal barriers to the employment of ex-
offenders must likewise be reassessed.  
A. The Inclusion of “Nondisqualifying Criminal Records” as Protected 
Status 
The single most important change necessary to protect ex-offenders 
from unwarranted discrimination is to amend Title VII to include 
“nondisqualifying criminal records” as a protected characteristic. In the 
five decades since its enactment, Title VII has proven remarkably immune 
to change, even as the American workplace has transformed dramatically. 
But the fact that Title VII remains limited to its original five protected 
categories hardly suggests other statuses are unworthy of federal 
protection. Indeed, characteristics such as age,
276
 disability,
277
 veteran 
status,
278
 and, more recently, genetic information,
279
 have received 
comparable protection through other statutory mechanisms. In this case, an 
alternative statutory scheme for protecting nondisqualifying criminal 
history seems unnecessary. Several states have incorporated similar 
 
 
 274. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § VII (alteration in original) (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-7) (“[S]tate and local laws or regulations are preempted by Title VII if they ‘purport[] 
to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice’ under Title 
VII.”). 
 275. Camacho v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 369 F.3d 570, 577–78 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that Title 
VII does not apply to licensing agencies). 
 276. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2013). 
 277. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2013). 
 278. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 
(2013). 
 279. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (2013). 
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protections into their general employment discrimination statutes without 
difficulty.
280
  
The amendment to Title VII would be the first to specify upfront that 
only “nondisqualifying criminal records” are protected. No state statute 
includes an explicit modifier in its statutory text, even though each law 
allows employers to consider certain types of criminal records, but not 
others.
281
 The modifier “nondisqualifying” would make clear that only 
certain ex-offenders are entitled to Title VII protection. This is important 
because without this modifier, one could argue that including “criminal 
records” alongside traits such as race and sex, which have been deemed to 
have no bearing on one’s fitness for employment, would render criminal 
records implicitly unrelated to job qualifications, which may not always be 
the case.
282
 Sometimes criminal history is related to job qualifications, but 
in many cases there is no relation or the connection is so attenuated that it 
lacks probative value. In the latter case, a person’s criminal history is no 
more relevant to her job performance than her race or sex. Consequently, 
“nondisqualifying criminal records” should be afforded the same 
protection as other Title VII traits.  
Discerning the relevancy of a person’s criminal record is a struggle for 
courts and criminologists alike—to say nothing of employers, many of 
whom lack the sophistication to make such a determination. The 
amendment must therefore provide employers with specific guidance on 
what constitutes a “criminal record,” and when that record is 
 
 
 280. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (2014) (including “arrest and court record” among 
twelve prohibited bases of employment discrimination); WIS. STAT. § 111.321 (2015) (including 
“arrest record” and “conviction record” among fourteen prohibited bases of employment 
discrimination). 
 281. Hawaii prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s criminal record, but allows an 
employer to consider a conviction less than ten years old that bears “a rational relationship to the 
duties and responsibilities of the position.” HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 378-2, 378-2.5(a), (c) (2014). Kansas 
prohibits discrimination based on “criminal history record information,” unless such information 
“reasonably bears upon [the individual’s] trustworthiness, or the safety or well-being of the employer’s 
employees or customers.” KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4710(f) (2015). New York prohibits discrimination 
based on “convict[ion] of one or more criminal offenses,” unless the conviction is job related or the 
individual would pose an unreasonable risk to property or the safety of others. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW 
§ 752 (McKinney Supp. 2013). Pennsylvania prohibits discrimination based on “[f]elony and 
misdemeanor convictions,” but only if they do not “relate to the applicant’s suitability for employment 
in the position for which he has applied.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9125(b) (West 2012). Wisconsin 
prohibits discrimination based on “arrest record” or “conviction record,” unless “the circumstances of 
the [offense] substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job or licensed activity.” WIS. 
STAT. § 111.335 (2015). 
 282. Thomas M. Hruz, The Unwisdom of the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act’s Ban of 
Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Conviction Records, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 779, 781 (2002); 
Paul-Emile, supra note 2, at 925. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] WHEN ANY SENTENCE IS A LIFE SENTENCE 87 
 
 
 
 
“nondisqualifying.” “Criminal record” should be broadly defined to 
include any information about an individual having been questioned, 
apprehended, taken into custody, detained, held for investigation, charged 
with an offense, served a summons, arrested (with or without a warrant), 
tried, or convicted of an offense.
283
  
Defining “nondisqualifying” is more challenging, but is nevertheless a 
crucial component of the amendment. Each state that prohibits 
discrimination against ex-offenders has included statutory guidance to 
help employers discern when they can and cannot consider a person’s 
criminal record.
284
 However, most of these provisions tend to be 
extremely general and therefore fail to provide employers with any 
meaningful assistance.
285
 New York is the lone exception to this trend. 
Like other states’ laws, the New York statute broadly asserts that an 
employer cannot deny an ex-offender employment based on a previous 
conviction unless it is job related or the person would impose an 
unreasonable risk to property or to the safety of others.
286
 But New York 
goes further by specifying eight factors employers must consider in 
determining the relevancy of an individual’s criminal background: (1) the 
state’s public policy to encourage the licensure and employment of ex-
offenders; (2) the specific duties and responsibilities of the license or 
employment; (3) how the individual’s criminal record would affect his 
ability to perform those specific duties and responsibilities; (4) the amount 
of time that has passed since the crime was committed; (5) how old the 
person was at the time of the crime; (6) the seriousness of the offense; 
(7) evidence of rehabilitation or good conduct; and (8) the employer’s 
legitimate interest in protecting both property and the safety and welfare of 
specific individuals or the general public.
287
  
The New York statute represents a helpful starting point for defining 
“nondisqualifying criminal records” under Title VII. Like the New York 
law, the amendment should limit the relevancy of criminal records to job 
relatedness and safety risks. But whereas New York authorizes employers 
to consider conviction records that are either job related or that create “an 
unreasonable risk” to property or the safety of others,
288
 Title VII should 
require both job-relatedness and an unreasonable risk. Accordingly, the 
 
 
 283. Hawaii has adopted a similar definition. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1 (2014). 
 284. See supra note 281. 
 285. See id. 
 286. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney Supp. 2013). 
 287. Id. § 753.1. 
 288. Id. § 752.1-.2. 
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amendment should specify that an individual’s criminal history is 
nondisqualifying unless there is a direct relationship between a previous 
criminal offense and the job in question, such that employing the 
individual would impose an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety 
of specific individuals or the general public.  
This approach makes sense because even if an individual’s criminal 
history is job related, that relationship only matters to the extent it creates 
an unreasonable risk to property or safety. For example, a theft conviction 
might be directly related to a hotel front desk clerk position, but if the 
hotel has security cameras that monitor the front desk area and a policy 
that two clerks must be present at the desk at all times, the security 
measures would minimize the risk of an ex-offender stealing from the cash 
register, thereby negating the importance of job-relatedness. Moreover, 
requiring both job-relatedness and unreasonable risk is consistent with 
disparate impact jurisprudence, which obliges an employer to show that its 
exclusionary policy is both job related and consistent with business 
necessity.
289
 Equating property and safety concerns with business 
necessity is hardly a stretch; courts have consistently made this same 
connection.
290
  
Like the New York statute, the amendment to Title VII should provide 
additional guidance on when a criminal record is nondisqualifying. 
However, rather than mandating that employers consider certain factors 
like the New York statute does,
291
 the amendment should follow the 
EEOC’s approach by providing a list of factors employers would be wise 
to consider in deciding whether an individual’s criminal record should 
disqualify him from employment.
292
 Framing the factors as 
 
 
 289. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2013) (providing that a plaintiff can prevail on a 
disparate impact claim where the defendant “fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity”); see also, e.g., Arizona v. 
City of Cottonwood, No. CV-11-1576-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 2976162, at *5–17 (D. Ariz. July 20, 
2012) (granting summary judgment to plaintiffs on disparate impact claim where defendant proved 
fitness test was job related but failed to establish business necessity). 
 290. See, e.g., El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that a policy 
against employing paratransit drivers with certain convictions constituted business necessity because 
of the safety risks of having an ex-offender work with vulnerable disabled passengers); EEOC v. 
Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753–54 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (finding that an employer’s 
policy banning the employment of any truck driver with a theft conviction involving an active prison 
sentence was justified by the business need to minimize losses from employee theft). 
 291. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753.1 (McKinney Supp. 2013). 
 292. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § V.B.9. Unlike the New York statute, 
the EEOC stops short of requiring employers to perform an individualized assessment, noting that 
although “Title VII . . . does not necessarily require individualized assessment in all circumstances . . . 
[it] can help employers avoid Title VII liability by allowing them to consider more complete 
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recommendations rather than requirements will steer employers toward 
considerations that are likely to bear most directly on an ex-offender’s 
suitability for employment, while preserving employers’ autonomy to 
consider other factors that may be unique to the work environment or the 
individual. This approach likewise allows employers to maintain bright-
line exclusionary policies in clear-cut cases, such as prohibiting an 
individual with a burglary conviction from working as a security system 
installer, or a sex offender from providing daycare services.
293
 To 
incentivize employers to consider such factors, the amendment should 
further provide that an employer that evaluates these factors and thereafter 
makes a reasonable, good-faith determination that such factors militate 
against employing the ex-offender is entitled to a rebuttable presumption 
that its denial of employment to an ex-offender was not a pretext for 
discrimination, in the case of a disparate treatment claim, or that its 
decision was job related and consistent with business necessity, in the case 
of a disparate impact claim. 
Both the New York statute and the EEOC Enforcement Guidance are 
helpful in formulating a list of recommendations to be included in Title 
VII to help employers determine whether a criminal record is 
nondisqualifying. Those factors can be condensed into the following 
recommendations. 
(1) Public Policy Encouraging the Employment of Ex-Offenders. 
Employers should assess an individual’s criminal record against a public 
policy backdrop that favors the employment of ex-offenders.
294
 This 
policy is reflected in existing offender rehabilitation legislation such as the 
Second Chance Act of 2007, which acknowledges a strong public interest 
in providing ex-offenders with legitimate employment opportunities and 
other resources “to break the cycle of criminal recidivism, increase public 
 
 
information on individual applicants or employees.” Id. § V.B.8. The EEOC’s list of potentially 
relevant factors overlaps with New York’s eight-factor test, but also includes factors such as whether 
the individual was “correctly identified in the criminal record,” the number of offenses committed, the 
individual’s “employment history before and after the offense,” and “[w]hether the individual is 
bonded.” Id. § V.B.9. 
 293. In El, the Third Circuit rejected the argument that Title VII prohibits any bright-line policy 
with regard to criminal convictions, reasoning that “[i]f a bright-line policy can distinguish between 
individual applicants that do and do not pose an unacceptable level of risk, then such a policy is 
consistent with business necessity.” 479 F.3d at 245. The EEOC likewise has acknowledged this 
possibility. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § V.B.4 (“Depending on the facts and 
circumstances, an employer may be able to justify a targeted criminal records screen solely under the 
Green factors.”). 
 294. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753.1(a) (requiring employers to consider the “public policy of 
this state . . . to encourage the licensure and employment of [ex-offenders]”). 
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safety, and help . . . better address the growing population of criminal 
offenders who return to their communities and commit new crimes.”295 
Including this recommendation in the amendment would call employers’ 
attention to the fact that employing an ex-offender can produce societal 
benefits spanning more than just the immediate employment 
relationship.
296
 With this mindset, employers may be more open to 
employing ex-offenders.  
(2) The Nature of the Criminal Record. Employers should scrutinize 
an ex-offender’s criminal record, not to assess guilt or innocence,297 but 
rather to determine if the offenses are a valid concern in light of the job in 
question. Not all criminal records are equal, and it would be irresponsible 
for an employer to treat them as such. Instead, an employer should 
consider pertinent factors relating to the record. For example, it may be 
appropriate for an employer to treat an ex-offender who committed a 
criminal act as a teenager more leniently than if the act was committed as 
an adult.
298
 The amount of time that has elapsed since the applicant last 
committed an offense is also a valid consideration.
299
 Although it is 
unrealistic to expect employers to discern when an ex-offender has 
reached redemption, certainly an offense committed twenty-five years 
earlier would be less probative than a more recent offense. Other factors 
employers should consider in evaluating a criminal record include the 
seriousness of the offense,
300
 the number of offenses,
301
 and any available 
facts surrounding the crime.
302
 
 
 
 295. 42 U.S.C. § 17501(a)(1) (2013). 
 296. See Jocelyn Simonson, Rethinking “Rational Discrimination” Against Ex-Offenders, 13 
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 283, 307–09 (2006) (arguing that protecting ex-offenders requires a 
shift from viewing the rationality of individual employment decisions to the rationality of the effect 
those decisions have on broader society).  
 297. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § V.B.3 (providing that it is reasonable 
in most cases for an employer to assume an individual engaged in a particular conduct based on a 
conviction record, “given the procedural safeguards associated with trials and guilty pleas”). 
 298. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753.1(e) (requiring employers to consider the “age of the person 
at the time of occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses”); EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, 
supra note 9, § V.B.9 (encouraging employers to consider “[o]lder age at the time of conviction, or 
release from prison”). 
 299. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753.1(d) (requiring employers to consider the “time which has 
elapsed since the occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses”). 
 300. See id. § 753.1(f) (requiring employers to consider the “seriousness of the offense or 
offenses”). 
 301. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § V.B.9 (encouraging employers to 
consider the “number of offenses for which the individual was convicted”). 
 302. See id. (encouraging employers to consider the “facts or circumstances surrounding the 
offense or conduct”). 
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(3) The Nature of the Job. In addition to evaluating the nature of the 
criminal record, an employer should also determine if and how the record 
relates to the specific job in question.
303
 This requires the employer to 
scrutinize various aspects of the employment position beyond just the job 
title. The EEOC Enforcement Guidance is instructive in this regard: 
While a factual inquiry may begin with identifying the job title, it 
also encompasses the nature of the job’s duties (e.g., data entry, 
lifting boxes), identification of the job’s essential functions, the 
circumstances under which the job is performed (e.g., the level of 
supervision, oversight, and interaction with co-workers or 
vulnerable individuals), and the environment in which the job’s 
duties are performed (e.g., out of doors, in a warehouse, in a private 
home).
304
 
This guidance seems well reasoned. For example, a hotel may be justified 
in refusing to hire a room attendant with a theft-related conviction because 
room attendants have access to guests’ rooms and often work 
unsupervised. However, it may be harder for a hotel to refuse to hire a 
shuttle driver with a theft conviction, since a driver would rarely be alone 
with guests’ property. Moreover, even a position-specific policy may be 
overbroad, depending on the individual circumstances under which 
employees perform their jobs. For example, a housekeeper’s conviction 
for theft may have less relevance if he were only assigned to clean the 
lobby, hallways, and other public areas than if he were given access to 
guests’ rooms. 
(4) Legitimate Risk of Harm to Property or Safety. Assessing whether 
there is a legitimate risk of harm to property or safety requires an 
employer to consider the type of property an ex-offender would have 
access to and the people with whom he would interact. A garbage collector 
or farmhand would typically have less access to valuable property than 
would a jeweler, such that the potential harm to property would rightly be 
of greater concern to the jewelry store. Moreover, if an ex-offender is 
likely to interact with children, the elderly, the disabled, or other 
vulnerable populations, the safety risk could understandably weigh more 
heavily in an employer’s assessment. In evaluating risk, employers must 
 
 
 303. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753.1(b)-(c) (requiring employers to consider the “specific duties 
and responsibilities necessarily related to the license or employment sought or held,” as well as what 
bearing the criminal record would have on the person’s “fitness or ability to perform . . . such duties or 
responsibilities”). 
 304. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § V.B.6.c. 
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resist the tendency to rely on what the Third Circuit referred to as “rough-
cut measures of employment-related qualities” or “more is better-style 
reasoning.”305 Absent proof an ex-offender has crossed the redemption 
point, hiring a person with a criminal background can almost always be 
said to increase the risk of harm to property or safety.
306
 However, an 
employer should not be able to rely on a generally elevated risk of harm 
alone; instead, it must carefully consider the types and amount of risk an 
ex-offender poses in light of his criminal record and the specific job duties 
in question. 
(5) Evidence of Good Character. In recognition that many people with 
criminal records can and do change, an employer should consider an 
individual’s criminal record together with any evidence of rehabilitation 
and good conduct produced by the ex-offender or on her behalf.
307
 Such 
evidence may include character references, employment history, 
references from former employers, completion of job training or 
educational programs, and civic involvement. For example, a trucking 
company may consider hiring a driver with a DUI conviction if the driver 
can show she successfully completed an Alcoholics Anonymous recovery 
program, speaks to community organizations about the dangers of drunk 
driving, joined Mothers Against Drunk Driving, and has worked as a 
delivery driver for the past two years without any problems. 
B. Banning the Box 
Title VII should also be amended to prohibit employers in most 
instances from inquiring about an applicant’s criminal history or running a 
criminal background check until after the applicant has completed at least 
one interview with the employer. Commonly referred to as “banning the 
box,” similar legislation has been enacted by, or is pending in, numerous 
states and municipalities.
308
 The purpose of this amendment is not to limit 
 
 
 305. El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 306. See id. at 246. 
 307. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753.1(g) (requiring employers to consider “[a]ny information 
produced by the person, or produced on his behalf, in regard to his rehabilitation and good conduct”); 
EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 9, § V.B.9 (encouraging employers to consider 
“[e]vidence that the individual performed the same type of work, post conviction, with the same or a 
different employer, with no known incidents of criminal conduct”; the individual’s employment 
history both pre- and post-offense; rehabilitation efforts such as education and training; character 
references; and “[w]hether the individual is bonded”). 
 308. See BAN THE BOX, supra note 15, at 6–7 (featuring a regularly updated list of states and 
municipalities that have passed or are considering ban-the-box laws). 
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the scope of an employer’s inquiry, but rather to control the timing of the 
investigation. Aside from making a “significant statement about public 
policy regarding the employment of ex-offenders,”
309
 controlling the 
timing of an employer’s inquiry into an applicant’s criminal history has 
the added benefit of providing ex-offenders greater control over what 
sociologist Erving Goffman referred to as “impression management.”
310
 
By delaying an employer’s knowledge of an ex-offender’s criminal history 
until after he has had the opportunity to convince the employer of his job 
qualifications, an employer may be more willing to overlook a criminal 
record in light of the applicant’s qualifications, whereas if the employer 
were to become aware of the criminal record prior to interviewing the 
applicant, the employer may automatically dismiss the candidate without 
ever having met him.
311
 Studies have shown that people ask stereotyped 
targets fewer questions, “selectively notice and retain information 
consistent with the stereotypes while ignoring information that is 
inconsistent with initial expectations,” and are “less likely to seek out or 
retain individuating information when confronted with members of 
stigmatized social groups.”
312
 This is particularly true of ex-offenders. 
Pager and colleagues’ audit study of 250 employers found that ex-
offenders’ ability to have personal contact with a potential employer 
“reduce[d] the effect of a criminal record” by approximately 15%, and that 
“testers who interact[ed] with employers [were] between four and six 
times more likely to receive a callback or job offer.”
313
 
Banning the box also benefits ex-offenders by providing greater 
incentive to apply for jobs. Most ex-offenders are under no illusion that 
finding employment after prison will be easy.
314
 Jessica Henry argues that 
“the mere presence of a question about criminal history may deter 
otherwise qualified [ex-offenders] from applying” for a job, which can 
“trigger[] a downward spiral in which ex-offenders fail to seek work 
because they believe they will not be hired, which in turn leaves them 
mired in chronic unemployment and often results in a return to criminal 
 
 
 309. Mullings, supra note 5, at 282. 
 310. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 208–37 (1959). 
 311. See Pager et al., supra note 68, at 197 (“[A] wealth of social psychological evidence indicates 
that negative stereotypes compromise interactions and undermine the ability of interaction partners to 
demonstrate traits that are inconsistent with stereotypical expectations.”). 
 312. Id. (citing studies). 
 313. Id. at 198–200. 
 314. See VERA KACHNOWSKI, URBAN INST., RETURNING HOME ILLINOIS POLICY BRIEF: 
EMPLOYMENT AND PRISONER REENTRY 2 (2005), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/ 
311215_employment.pdf. 
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behavior.”
315
 While it is true that banning the box may only delay the 
inevitable in some cases, the fact that an employer would not be able to 
dismiss an ex-offender’s job application out of hand may provide ex-
offenders with sufficient encouragement to more aggressively pursue 
employment. 
Amending Title VII would resolve many of the issues left open by 
existing ban-the-box laws. Some commentators argue that existing laws 
are ineffective because they merely postpone discrimination.
316
 However, 
delaying discrimination would not be an issue under the proposed 
amendments because Title VII would prohibit discrimination based on 
nondisqualifying criminal records. Concerns that some ban-the-box laws 
only regulate the timing of an employer’s inquiry without imposing any 
limits on what an employer does with the information
317
 are likewise 
inapplicable, since the amendments to Title VII would also include 
specific guidance on how to determine whether a criminal record is 
nondisqualifying. Lastly, employers may be critical of ban-the-box laws 
that require them to wait to conduct a background check until after they 
extend a conditional offer of employment
318
 or deem the candidate 
otherwise qualified for employment
319
 as unduly burdensome to the hiring 
process itself by requiring employers to spend valuable time and resources 
courting candidates they are otherwise entitled to exclude based on their 
criminal histories. This concern can be alleviated, at least in part, by 
allowing employers to inquire about an applicant’s criminal history after 
just one interview rather than waiting until further in the interview 
process. Additionally, the amendment should include an exception for 
employers in industries where state or federal laws require background 
checks or otherwise restrict ex-offender employment.  
One potential concern that the amendment would not directly address is 
the possibility that without criminal history information, employers might 
“statistically discriminate” against minority candidates by excluding them 
from consideration based on their assumption that minorities are likely to 
 
 
 315. Jessica S. Henry, Criminal History on a “Need to Know” Basis: Employment Policies that 
Eliminate the Criminal History Box on Employment Applications, JUST. POL’Y J., Fall 2008, at 1, 6, 
available at http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/criminal_history.pdf. 
 316. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 14, at 211 (stating that ban-the-box laws generally do not 
preclude an employer’s consideration of criminal records, but “simply delay it to later stages in the 
screening process”). 
 317. Id. at 211, 215 (criticizing a Texas ban-the-box law as “say[ing] nothing about the factors 
employers should consider when evaluating applicants with criminal histories”).  
 318. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5(b) (2014). 
 319. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-80(b) (2015). 
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have criminal records.
320
 This would place minority candidates without 
criminal records in a worse position than if they were allowed to reveal on 
the job application that their criminal history is clean.
321
 At this juncture, it 
is unclear how often employers actually engage in statistical 
discrimination or if a federal ban-the-box law would impact this practice. 
At any rate, even though the amendments to Title VII would not directly 
address this concern, the fact remains that an employer’s denial of 
employment based on stereotypical assumptions about a Title VII-
protected trait such as race or national origin is prohibited.
322
 
C. Negligent Hiring 
The amendments to Title VII proposed in this article stand little chance 
of enactment unless employers are adequately protected from negligent 
hiring claims that may arise with more ex-offenders in the workplace. The 
threat of negligent hiring liability is a significant deterrent to employing 
ex-offenders for many businesses.
323
 While the possibility of negligent 
hiring liability cannot and should not be eliminated, the tort should be 
made more employer friendly. To this end, Title VII should be amended to 
establish a federal cause of action for negligent hiring.
324
 The amendment 
should create a rebuttable presumption that an offending employee’s 
criminal history should be excluded from evidence in a negligent hiring 
case if the employer hired the individual after engaging in the five-factor 
analysis proposed in Part III.A. In cases where the employer engaged in 
 
 
 320. See Michael A. Stoll, Ex-Offenders, Criminal Background Checks, and Racial Consequences 
in the Labor Market, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 400–07 (noting that some evidence suggests that in 
the absence of criminal information employers will assume black males have a criminal history and 
exclude them from consideration). 
 321. Mullings, supra note 5, at 283  (citing Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal 
Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451 (2006) 
(“‘[S]tatistical discrimination’ raises the possibility of putting some individuals, particularly African 
American males without criminal records, in a worse position than they would be if information about 
criminal records were available at the outset of the hiring process.”)).  
 322. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, FACTS ABOUT RACE/COLOR DISCRIMINATION 
(2008), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/fs-race.html (“Title VII also prohibits employment 
decisions based on stereotypes and assumptions about abilities, traits, or the performance of 
individuals of certain racial groups.”). 
 323. JENNIFER FAHEY ET AL., CRIME & JUSTICE INST., EMPLOYMENT OF EX-OFFENDERS: 
EMPLOYER PERSPECTIVES ii (2006), available at http://208.109.185.81/files/ex_offenders_employers_ 
12-15-06.pdf (noting that over half of surveyed employers feared liability for hiring ex-offenders). 
 324. The amendment should likewise apply to negligent retention and negligent supervision 
claims. 
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the five-factor analysis, damages should be limited to Title VII’s existing 
caps.  
Although nearly every state recognizes the tort of negligent hiring, 
there are significant differences in state laws.
325
 This variance not only 
leads to the inconsistent treatment of employers in negligent hiring cases, 
but can cause employers to treat ex-offender applicants differently 
depending on a particular state’s law. Reforming negligent hiring laws 
through an amendment to Title VII rather than at the state level would help 
ensure employers are held to the same standards in every state. If 
employers are going to be subject to federal law when it comes to 
discriminating against ex-offenders, it only makes sense that a federal 
standard would also apply in holding employers liable for the hiring 
decisions they make as a result of those antidiscrimination standards.
326
 
Unlike Title VII’s other provisions, which only cover businesses with 
fifteen or more employees,
327
 the negligent hiring amendment should 
apply to employers of any size. The amendment should set forth the 
precise elements of a negligent hiring claim, namely that: (1) an 
employment relationship existed between the employer and the offending 
employee; (2) the offending employee was unfit for employment under the 
circumstances of the position; (3) the employer failed to conduct a 
reasonable and appropriate investigation or knew or should have known 
the employee was unfit for employment; (4) the offending employee’s 
actions caused the plaintiff to suffer harm; (5) the negligent hiring of the 
offending employee proximately caused the plaintiff’s harm; and (6) the 
plaintiff actually suffered harm as a result of the offending employee’s 
actions.
328
 Additionally, the negligent hiring amendment should follow 
New York’s lead
329
 by creating a rebuttable presumption that the 
offending employee’s criminal history should be excluded from evidence 
if the employer hired the employee based on its good-faith assessment of 
the five factors set forth in Part III.A. This presumption offers employers a 
 
 
 325. See Vance, supra note 253, at 199 (arguing that a more uniform negligent hiring law is 
required in light of key differences in how state laws have been developed, the level of foreseeability 
required by employers, and the guidance given to employers on how to avoid liability). 
 326. See Dermot Sullivan, Employee Violence, Negligent Hiring, and Criminal Records Checks: 
New York’s Need to Reevaluate Its Priorities to Promote Public Safety, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 581, 
604 (1998) (“[E]mployers should not be exposed to unlimited liability when judicial constructions 
appear to restrict their power to fully evaluate the compatibility of an ex-offender’s record with the 
responsibilities of the available position.”). 
 327. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(b) (2013). 
 328. Feeley, supra note 255, at 94. 
 329. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.15 (McKinney Supp. 2013). 
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substantial advantage in defending against negligent hiring claims and thus 
would further incentivize employers to perform the five-factor assessment 
rather than dismiss—or hire—ex-offenders without appropriate scrutiny.  
The negligent hiring amendment should also subject damages to Title 
VII’s existing caps if the employer hired the offending employee after 
engaging in the five-factor analysis. Because the negligent hiring 
provision would apply to employers of any size, the amendment should 
make clear that the existing cap for employers with fifteen to one hundred 
employees would likewise apply to employers with fewer than fifteen 
employees. Although sure to be unpopular with the plaintiffs’ bar,
330
 
damages caps have become commonplace in a variety of industries.
331
 
Capping damages would provide yet another incentive for employers to 
thoroughly evaluate an ex-offender’s criminal record. The cap would also 
protect businesses’ financial stability by giving employers a more realistic 
idea of what their potential exposure would be if they lost such a suit, so 
they could plan their insurance and bonding needs accordingly.
332
  
Limiting an employer’s liability for hiring an ex-offender is surely a 
controversial prospect. Yet several states have successfully done so. Texas 
recently passed a law that prohibits most negligent hiring or supervision 
claims based on an employee’s criminal record.
333
 In Florida, an employer 
that conducts a criminal background check that does not reveal 
information demonstrating unsuitability for employment is entitled to a 
rebuttable presumption against negligent hiring liability.
334
 And North 
Carolina altogether bars negligent hiring claims if the ex-offender obtained 
a certificate of relief from a court.
335
 These limitations reflect a 
 
 
 330. Although a damages cap would limit the amount of recovery in some cases, Sullivan argues 
that a cap might actually benefit plaintiffs, as courts may be more willing to “allow negligent hiring 
cases to proceed to trial” because there would be less “fear of juries setting extremely high precedents 
for future awards.” Sullivan, supra note 326, at 602. 
 331. Sullivan, supra note 326, at 602–03 (noting that states limit negligence liability in a variety 
of areas, such as environmental pollution, aircraft disasters, medical malpractice, and negligent 
bailment). 
 332. Monica Scales, Employer Catch-22: The Paradox Between Employer Liability for Employee 
Criminal Acts and the Prohibition Against Ex-Convict Discrimination, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 
437 (2002). 
 333. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 142.001–.002 (West 2013) (providing that negligent 
hiring claims are allowed if the employee was convicted of an offense that was committed while 
performing duties similar to those reasonably expected to be performed, or if the conviction was for a 
sexually violent offense, murder, child-related offenses, aggravated robbery, or certain other offenses); 
see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (West 2013). 
 334. FLA. STAT. § 768.096(1) (2015). 
 335. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-173.5 (2014). A certificate of relief is only available for certain types 
of offenses, and likewise requires proof of rehabilitation and a determination that “[g]ranting the 
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recognition that it would be unfair for employers to have to shoulder the 
entire burden of employing ex-offenders. Because society as a whole 
stands to benefit from the employment of ex-offenders, it is important that 
both employers and the public share in this responsibility. 
D. Potential Impact 
The amendments to Title VII proposed in this article would benefit 
society in several important ways. At the outset, it is important to 
recognize the potential significance of this legislation from a public policy 
perspective. For years, the federal government has acknowledged the need 
to help ex-offenders find employment and has even apportioned 
substantial funding to this endeavor.
336
 But its unwillingness to pass 
legislation that directly improves an ex-offender’s chances of employment 
has rendered many of its reentry initiatives somewhat hollow. Federal 
legislation that prohibits employment discrimination based on 
nondisqualifying criminal records, “bans the box” on job applications, and 
limits negligent hiring liability would signal to the public that the 
government is unequivocally committed to helping ex-offenders turn their 
lives around. With the federal government’s backing, it is reasonable to 
expect other social institutions to follow suit in helping to remove 
unnecessary and unfair barriers to reentry. 
The single most important goal of the proposed amendments is to 
reduce the United States’ exorbitant recidivism rate. It is well settled that 
employment is one of the most—if not the most—important factors in 
determining whether an ex-offender successfully reintegrates into 
society.
337
 Therefore, placing more ex-offenders in the workforce may be 
more effective in reducing recidivism than any other policy change. 
Lowering recidivism not only improves the health and life prospects of ex-
offenders, but also promotes stronger families and more integrated 
communities.
338
 At a societal level, successfully reintegrating ex-offenders 
can help lower corrections expenses, reduce crime rates, and create a 
stronger labor force.
339
 
 
 
petition would not pose an unreasonable risk to the safety or welfare of the public or any individual.” 
Id. § 15A-173.2(b)(1)-(6). 
 336. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 337. See supra Part I.D. 
 338. See supra Part I.E. 
 339. See supra Part I.E. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/7
  
 
 
 
 
2015] WHEN ANY SENTENCE IS A LIFE SENTENCE 99 
 
 
 
 
In addition to reducing recidivism, the proposed amendments would 
help break down rigid stereotypes about people with criminal records. As 
more ex-offenders enter the workforce and are able to prove their value, 
the disdain and discomfort that supervisors and coworkers may initially 
feel eventually could be replaced with tolerance, if not admiration, for ex-
offenders who are striving to overcome their pasts. By proving themselves 
in the workplace, ex-offenders may likewise help remove barriers to 
reentry in other areas, such as housing and education. Of course, there are 
risks that come with eliminating stereotypes about ex-offenders and 
removing reentry barriers. An argument could certainly be made that 
stereotypes and barriers serve important social functions like deterring 
criminal activity and reinforcing the bounds of socially acceptable 
behavior. But while these proposals could conceivably normalize criminal 
behavior on some level, the threat of imprisonment likely remains a much 
more powerful deterrent and boundary setter than post-release stigmas and 
reentry barriers ever could. A potentially more serious possibility is that in 
the absence of stereotypes and reentry barriers, people may let their guard 
down, thereby making themselves vulnerable to theft, assault, or other 
criminal acts by ex-offenders. Whether it is possible for society to embrace 
ex-offenders while exercising appropriate caution remains to be seen.  
While these proposals would clearly benefit many ex-offenders, their 
potential impact on employers is less certain. On the one hand, employers 
may benefit from larger and more diverse applicant pools that include 
highly qualified ex-offenders who might otherwise be overlooked. Indeed, 
initial research suggests ex-offenders perform no worse, and in fact may 
perform better in some regards, than non-offender employees.
340
 On the 
other hand, the amendments present new avenues for liability—hardly 
welcome news for employers struggling to stay afloat in this era of mass 
litigation. This places employers between a rock and a hard place by 
exposing them to liability if they fail to hire an ex-offender with a 
nondisqualifying criminal record, but also if they hire an ex-offender who 
later harms a third party. The amendments seek to alleviate this 
conundrum as much as possible by giving employers practical guidance 
regarding when a criminal record is nondisqualifying, creating rebuttable 
presumptions against discrimination and negligent hiring, and capping 
negligent hiring damages in certain cases.  
The potential impact of the amendments on the public is similarly 
mixed. As previously discussed, reducing recidivism is not only beneficial 
 
 
 340. See generally Roberts et al., supra note 103. 
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to the individual and his family, but also to communities and society at 
large.
341
 The public certainly stands to benefit generally from ex-offender 
employment, whether through lower taxes or a stronger labor force.
342
 
Moreover, as stereotypes about ex-offenders subside, members of the 
public can individually benefit by developing social connections with a 
segment of society that might otherwise be inaccessible. Yet these public 
benefits are of little worth if ex-offender employment jeopardizes safety. 
Because employment lowers recidivism, it is conceivable that employing 
more ex-offenders may actually increase public safety. However, this is 
unlikely to placate a customer or employee who comes into direct, 
unsupervised contact with an ex-offender employee.  
With regard to safety, it is important to note that under the proposed 
amendments, an employer’s duty to protect third parties from 
unreasonably dangerous employees remains unchanged. Thus, at least in 
theory, the amendments should not make workplaces any less safe since 
they only promote the employment of ex-offenders with nondisqualifying 
criminal records. Employers would still have every right—and indeed 
every obligation—to exclude from employment any ex-offender who 
poses an unreasonable risk. Certainly there will be times when employers 
erroneously deem an ex-offender suitable for employment and the ex-
offender subsequently harms a third party. Ideally, such instances would 
become less common as employers more carefully scrutinize an 
applicant’s criminal background. However, the threat of a discrimination 
claim may cause some employers to err on the side of hiring ex-offenders 
who present “close calls” simply to avoid a lawsuit. Regardless, an 
employer’s duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring an ex-offender 
remains unchanged by the amendments. If an employer acts unreasonably, 
third-party tort victims would have all the same rights to recovery that 
currently exist. 
Lastly, it is important to acknowledge that as crucial as these proposed 
amendments are, they represent just one part of the solution. As previously 
discussed, state and federal barriers to the employment and occupational 
licensing of ex-offenders must also be overhauled. Furthermore, while the 
proposed amendments would be a boon to ex-offenders with relatively 
minor or outdated offenses—particularly if they possess marketable skills 
and are free from mental or physical health or dependency issues—a 
sizeable portion of the ex-offender population unfortunately does not fit 
 
 
 341. See supra Part I.E. 
 342. See supra Part I.E. 
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this description. For many ex-offenders, if their criminal records do not 
disqualify them from employment, other factors such as low education, 
poor skills and training, and drug and alcohol addiction will. Therefore, 
prisoner rehabilitation programs that focus on education, vocational skills, 
and physical and mental well-being must be enhanced in order to elevate 
these ex-offenders to the point where the proposed amendments would be 
of true benefit. 
CONCLUSION 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is one of the most important laws ever 
enacted, in part because it has fundamentally altered how we treat groups 
of people who were long considered deserving of discrimination. Perhaps 
more so than other industrialized nations, the United States has proven 
particularly inhospitable to ex-offenders, imposing a vast network of both 
formal and informal sanctions to ensure people with criminal records 
continue serving a life sentence long after their prison terms are 
complete.
343
 While some collateral consequences can be legally justified, 
most cannot. Accordingly, it is appropriate to draw upon the Civil Rights 
Act to change the way we think about—and treat—our growing ex-
offender population. 
Advocating for the employment of ex-offenders is a delicate task. No 
matter the proposal, there are bound to be risks and rewards, winners and 
losers. But with more than sixty-five million Americans with criminal 
records,
344
 the time has come for comprehensive federal reform that 
empowers ex-offenders to turn their lives around through greater 
employment opportunities. To be sure, these efforts must carefully and 
responsibly balance the employment needs of ex-offenders with valid 
concerns about safety. The amendments proposed in this article attempt to 
strike such a balance. They encourage ex-offender employment by 
prohibiting discrimination based on nondisqualifying criminal records, 
banning employers from inquiring about an applicant’s criminal history 
until after the first interview, and limiting an employer’s liability for 
negligent hiring. But the amendments also protect employers’ and the 
 
 
 343. Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of 
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 459, 465, 501 (2010) (arguing that in addition to locking up 
more of its citizens than any other country, “the United States imposes collateral consequences that are 
harsher and more pervasive than those in [other developed countries],” and that “both criminal 
convictions and their long-reaching effects are more permanent in the United States”). 
 344. 65 MILLION, supra note 3, at 3. 
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public’s interests by providing meaningful guidance on when an ex-
offender’s criminal record is nondisqualifying. Employers who follow this 
guidance are entitled to a rebuttable presumption against liability in 
discrimination cases, and in negligent hiring cases both a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of excluding evidence of an offending employee’s 
criminal record and a damages cap. These are reasonable proposals 
designed to promote the employment of ex-offenders in appropriate cases, 
while safeguarding employers from excessive liability and the public from 
unreasonable risk. For many ex-offenders, these measures could mean the 
difference between recidivism and redemption. 
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